Deterring war or courting disaster: an analysis of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean by Wueger, Diana Beth
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-03
Deterring war or courting disaster: an analysis of
nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean
Wueger, Diana Beth














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
DETERRING WAR OR COURTING DISASTER: 
AN ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 








Thesis Advisor:  S. Paul Kapur 
Second Reader: Christopher P. Twomey 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
DETERRING WAR OR COURTING DISASTER: AN ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Diana Beth Wueger  
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
 
One of the core assumptions of nuclear strategy is that submarine-based deterrent assets stabilize deterrent relationships by 
providing an assured second-strike capability. As India progresses toward an operational sea-based deterrent, this thesis seeks to 
qualify this foundational assumption by exploring the empirical conditions under which this principle operated during the Cold 
War. It then examines whether these conditions—and by extension the standard logic regarding sea-based deterrence—apply in 
South Asia. Using the India-China and India-Pakistan dyads as discrete cases, this thesis analyzes the potential effects of India’s 
introduction of a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) on each dyad. While an operational sea-based deterrent should hypothetically 
provide India with a greater sense of existential security vis-à-vis China, there is little evidence to suggest that India will cease to 
pursue additional nuclear or conventional capabilities. India’s SSBN thus fails to resolve perceived security threats from China, 
even as it exacerbates arms racing tendencies in Pakistan. Furthermore, it is likely to generate conventional maritime arms races in 
both dyads that could prove destabilizing in a crisis. This thesis finds that assumptions based on Cold War-era analyses do not 
accommodate the geographic, bureaucratic, operational, or strategic realities of South Asia. Thus, this thesis concludes that 
traditional assumptions about SSBNs fail to acknowledge the conditionality of their strategic value while overlooking the potential 
dangers posed by the introduction of these systems. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
India, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Indian Ocean Region, strategic stability, regional stability, 
nuclear deterrence, arms race stability, crisis stability, SSBN, incidents at sea, SLBM, Arihant, Cold 
War, nuclear triad, ASW  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
95 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 i 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
DETERRING WAR OR COURTING DISASTER: 
AN ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
 
 
Diana Beth Wueger 
Civilian, Department of the Navy 
B.A., Oberlin College, 2006 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
























Mohammed M. Hafez 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iii 
 iv 




One of the core assumptions of nuclear strategy is that submarine-based deterrent assets 
stabilize deterrent relationships by providing an assured second-strike capability. As 
India progresses toward an operational sea-based deterrent, this thesis seeks to qualify 
this foundational assumption by exploring the empirical conditions under which this 
principle operated during the Cold War. It then examines whether these conditions—and 
by extension the standard logic regarding sea-based deterrence—apply in South Asia. 
Using the India-China and India-Pakistan dyads as discrete cases, this thesis analyzes the 
potential effects of India’s introduction of a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) on each 
dyad. While an operational sea-based deterrent should hypothetically provide India with a 
greater sense of existential security vis-à-vis China, there is little evidence to suggest that 
India will cease to pursue additional nuclear or conventional capabilities. India’s SSBN 
thus fails to resolve perceived security threats from China, even as it exacerbates arms 
racing tendencies in Pakistan. Furthermore, it is likely to generate conventional maritime 
arms races in both dyads that could prove destabilizing in a crisis. This thesis finds that 
assumptions based on Cold War-era analyses do not accommodate the geographic, 
bureaucratic, operational, or strategic realities of South Asia. Thus, this thesis concludes 
that traditional assumptions about SSBNs fail to acknowledge the conditionality of their 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Within the next decade, both India and Pakistan are likely to have deployed 
nuclear weapons on submarines. China has already achieved this milestone and may 
eventually extend deterrence patrols into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). By the end of 
the Cold War, the value of the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad was unquestioned; 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) offered the secure second-strike capability that 
cemented mutually assured destruction, and thus, created strategic stability between the 
two superpowers. Given the complex security dynamics between India, Pakistan, and 
China, it is hardly surprising that all three countries are pursuing a nuclear triad. 
As medium nuclear powers move toward triads, however, it is worth examining 
whether sea-based nuclear weapons are indeed as stabilizing to adversarial dyads as is 
traditionally held. Cold War analyses of ballistic missile submarine dynamics addressed 
two large submarine forces, operating in maritime and geostrategic environments that 
differ radically from that of South Asia. For the United States, questions of bureaucratic 
and organizational change, the sustainability of acquisitions, and the advances in anti-
submarine warfare capabilities also loomed large in its efforts to establish and maintain a 
credible assured second-strike delivery system. As this thesis will show, the literature and 
theory developed around the Cold War does not accommodate the relatively small size 
and relative inexperience of the South Asian submarine services, the asymmetry between 
India and China’s fleets, and the vagaries of India’s naval acquisition and development 
programs. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean presents a different geostrategic picture than 
the Barents Sea or Kamchatka Peninsula did during the Cold War, and therefore presents 
different operational and tactical problems for these navies and policymakers—with 
distinct strategic implications.  
By studying the conditions under which sea-based deterrents benefit stability, we 
can gain some insight into the impact sea-based nuclear weapons could have on security 
dynamics in South Asia. Given the dissimilarities between the Cold War and the South 
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Asian cases, this thesis will evaluate how applicable the traditional model is to South 
Asia. In Section 1.C, Problems and Hypotheses, I identify four main problems or 
challenges associated with the acquisition and induction of SSBNs and the impact these 
challenges could have on arms race stability and crisis stability. I then examine the 
empirical evidence to determine how the United States succeeded or failed to address 
these challenges and, by extension, the internal and external conditions under which sea-
based deterrence operated during the Cold War. These challenges and conditions are then 
applied to the South Asian dyads to determine the potential regional impacts of an Indian 
triad. I conclude that while an operational sea-based deterrent should hypothetically 
provide India with a greater sense of existential security vis-à-vis China, it is unlikely to 
cause India to abandon its pursuit of additional nuclear capabilities, suggesting that the 
introduction of an Indian SSBN does not offer the solution to India’s perceived security 
threats from China. An Indian sea-based deterrent does, however, exacerbate arms racing 
tendencies in Pakistan, even as its induction poses substantial challenges for the Indian 
political and naval establishments. Furthermore, while an Indian SSBN fleet could 
provide stability at the strategic or nuclear level under certain conditions, it is also likely 
to generate conventional maritime arms races in both dyads. The growth of conventional 
naval arsenals could have potentially deleterious effects on crisis stability, particularly if 
they come into contact with strategic systems.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
In August 2013, the reactor for INS Arihant, India’s first indigenously built 
SSBN, went critical, marking a milestone in India’s development of advanced undersea 
capabilities. First launched in 2009 for several years of trials, Arihant is powered by an 
83-megawatt nuclear reactor and is expected to carry 12 submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs), referred to as K-15 or Sagarika.1 India has indicated that it intends to 
build a five- or six-ship Arihant-class fleet that would provide a secure and assured 
                                                 




second-strike capability.2 Pakistan has also been pursuing the nuclear weaponization of 
its submarine force, even as it has been in discussions to acquire new air-independent 
propulsion (AIP) diesel submarines (SSPs) that represent a substantial improvement over 
its current fleet. Chinese attack submarines have been seen patrolling in the Indian 
Ocean, which India has taken as an effort to “[undermine] the Indian Navy’s [ability] ‘to 
control highly-sensitive sea lines of communication.’”3 The recent announcement that 
Pakistan is moving to finalize a contract for Chinese submarines, along with China’s 
continued development of the port at Gwadar, suggests the China-Pakistan maritime 
relationship is deepening, potentially to India’s detriment.4 
These developments have serious implications for regional stability. After a series 
of wars and countless border skirmishes over the last 60 years, the India-Pakistan conflict 
remains unresolved. Pakistan’s disadvantage against India in its conventional military 
capabilities has endured, and the conventional gap between the rivals will only grow as 
India invests heavily in new, more advanced weapons systems. India has also developed 
what is colloquially known as the Cold Start doctrine, which calls for a rapid but shallow 
incursion into Pakistan.5 Cold Start is seen in India as a doctrine for limited war, rather 
than a total war that would certainly invite nuclear retaliation by Pakistan. As Pakistan’s 
ability to deter India conventionally has withered, it has developed short-range, low-yield 
                                                 
2 Praveen Swami, “Arihant Propels India to Elite Club, but with a Headache,” The Hindu, June 4, 
2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/arihant-propels-india-to-elite-club-but-with-a-
headache/article6079477.ece; Rahul Bedi, “Indian Navy Plans New Carrier, SSBN Base in Bay of Bengal,” 
IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 31, 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/42605/indian-navy-plans-new-
carrier-ssbn-base-in-bay-of-bengal. The Arihant-class fleet size has been variously reported as low as two 
and as high as five. Three SSBNs is the bare minimum necessary for continuous deterrent patrols, which 
would be the most reasonable force posture for India’s ballistic missile fleet, as India does not have a 
natural bastion area in which to station its boats. 
3 Rahul Singh, “China’s Submarines in Indian Ocean Worry Indian Navy,” Hindustan Times, April 7, 
2013, http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/China-s-submarines-in-Indian-Ocean-worry-
Indian-Navy/Article1-1038689.aspx. 
4 Saibal Dasgupta, “Pak Set to Get Chinese Submarines amid Sub Crisis in India,” The Times of India, 
March 1, 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/Pak-set-to-get-Chinese-submarines-amid-
sub-crisis-in-India/articleshow/31191301.cms; Vijay Sakhuja, Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: 
Strategic Transactions: China, India, and Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2011), 277, 280. 




nuclear weapons that could be used against an Indian offensive column that crossed the 
international border in a Cold Start-style attack.6 Pakistani interlocutors have suggested 
that Pakistan might be willing to use these low-yield nuclear weapons on its own territory 
to halt an Indian advance. While not entirely credible, India has suggested it would 
massively retaliate against any nuclear use against Indian troops, even if those troops 
were on Pakistani soil at the time. The rivals may be in a temporary checkmate situation, 
but nonstate actors sponsored by Pakistan remain a wild card; another Mumbai-style 
attack could spark a shooting war that carries the possibility of a nuclear exchange. 
The India-China relationship is less volatile but also troubled; while there is less 
concern about a surprise trigger event, there remain outstanding territorial disputes, with 
occasional flare-ups of tensions such as the September 2014 standoff in Ladakh.7 
Looking ahead, both states are actively pursuing great power status through economic 
and military development and modernization. In order to continue their rapid growth, 
India and China require secure access to oil. The volume of trade that passes through the 
Indian Ocean is staggering; roughly two-thirds of the world’s petroleum products transit 
this space, along with 50% of the world’s container traffic.8 The need to protect and 
control this trade is a critical driver of naval expansion and modernization among 
regional actors. The combination of economic incentives, pervasive mistrust, and 
unresolved historical conflicts has generated a conventional and nuclear arms race, in 
which the introduction of sea-based nuclear weapons is a significant development. 
                                                 
6 See inter alia Shashank Joshi, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà Vu?,” The Washington 
Quarterly 36, no. 3 (2013): 159–72; David Smith, “The U.S. Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: 
Lessons for South Asia,” Washington, DC: Stimson Center, March 3, 2013; Jeffrey McCausland, 
“Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Operational Myths and Realities,” Washington, DC: Stimson 
Center, March 10, 2015. 
7 Shannon Tiezzi, “China, India End Military Stand-Off Along Disputed Border,” The Diplomat, 
October 1, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/china-india-end-military-stand-off-along-disputed-
border/. 
8 Salman Khurshid, Julie Bishop, and Marty Natalegawa, “Putting out to Sea a New Vision,” The 
Hindu, November 2, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/putting-out-to-sea-a-new-
vision/article5305845.ece. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The central question this thesis will address is under what conditions SSBNs can 
be said to contribute to stability. While the Cold War adversaries achieved strategic 
stability, the conditions under which they operated their ballistic missile submarines 
fleets are not the same conditions as exist in South Asia today. This thesis seeks to argue 
that the introduction of SSBNs in the IOR will be problematic for four main reasons: 
1. Bureaucratic and Organizational Change: The induction of nuclear-
powered submarines requires significant bureaucratic and organizational 
change in order to make the delivery systems safe and assured; absent 
these changes, an adversary may convince itself that the putative second-
strike capability is not credible or could be attrited. A more credible and 
assured second strike can dampen strategic arms race incentives through 
mutual vulnerability, particularly when the missile ranges are long and the 
missiles reliable. It also stabilizes crises by mitigating first mover 
advantages and reducing use-or-lose pressures.  
2. Advancements in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): SSBNs generate a 
concurrent demand for the ability to monitor and potentially defeat an 
adversary’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities—particularly a 
demand for quiet, nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSNs). As 
ASW capabilities grow qualitatively and quantitatively, the perceived 
need for additional strategic assets may also increase. During crises, an 
adversary’s ASW assets may generate use-or-lose pressures on strategic 
systems. SSNs could also cause crises to break out as the result of 
accidents or incidents at sea. 
3. Operational Areas and Geostrategic Realities: The characteristics of 
operational areas matter, especially when missile ranges are limited. In 
South Asia, geostrategic realities make India’s SSBNs more threatening to 
Pakistan than to China simply because of the distances involved. The arms 
race implications for the India-Pakistan dyad are clear: Pakistan’s 
vulnerability has already generated demand for increased ASW 
capabilities as well as its own nuclear triad. China is less likely to change 
its nuclear force structure in response to Indian advances, but may opt to 
deploy more passive and active ASW assets near chokepoints. Operational 
realities also affect crisis stability. By virtue of their constant mobility, 
SSBNs carry an unavoidable risk of accidental contact with an adversary 
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during peacetime.9 The South Asia navies operate in much more 
congested waters than the Cold War navies did, with an attendant higher 
risk of accidents or incidents at sea. Congestion also makes ASW more 
difficult, and Pakistan in particular may fear a surprise attack from an 
Indian SSBN.  
4. Naval and Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: Greater clarity about command 
and control and plans for civilian oversight would be stabilizing factors. 
Naval doctrine and strategy is also important; naval strategies that 
envision the early, preemptive use of ASW against strategic assets in a 
crisis are inherently threatening. The growth of India’s SSBN fleet beyond 
a scant handful of boats could be read as a signal that India’s commitment 
to No First Use is weakening, generating upward pressure on strategic 
arsenals. Beyond the impact of aggressive naval strategy, crisis stability 
could also be threatened if Indian C2 fails.  
Using these four categories of challenges, I will explore what conditions had to be 
met in the Cold War to generate strategic stability, then turn to the Indian dyads to 
determine which of these conditions may or may not hold and thus whether India’s SSBN 
will offer the stability and security that India seeks. It is this thesis’s contention that India 
will be incurring significant costs and risks without resolving its primary security 
concerns with either China or Pakistan. 
The literature on deterrence generally holds that SSBNs stabilize deterrent 
relationships by providing an assured second-strike capability that dampens arms racing 
behavior and reduces first-use incentives. By making nuclear assets harder to find, 
SSBNs ensure that even if an incoming counterforce first strike destroyed the land-based 
weapons, the sea-based arsenal would remain available for countervalue retaliation.10 
Once this assured second-strike capability is reached, there should be less incentive to 
                                                 
9 This risk is aggravated by the need for stealth on the part of SSBNs. While nuclear-armed aircraft 
and surface ships could come into accidental contact, there is a greater chance of early detection and greater 
situational awareness with these types of systems. Submarines, on the other hand, must remain undetected 
to remain safe. This has even led to collisions between allies, who ostensibly have little reason to keep the 
other in the dark about operational areas and plans. The 2009 collision between the British SSBN HMS 
Vanguard and the French SSBN FNS Le Triomphant stands as one such example. See Rachel Williams and 
Richard Norton-Taylor, “Nuclear Submarines Collide in Atlantic,” The Guardian, February 16, 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/feb/16/nuclear-submarines-collide. 
10 A counterforce strike targets an adversary’s nuclear weapons, including related command and 
control infrastructure. A countervalue strike is a nuclear strike against a civilian target, such as a major 
population center. A countervalue strategy was expected to hold cities hostage by threatening to inflict 
unacceptable damage, thus engendering deterrence by threat of unacceptable punishment. 
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arms race, as there is theoretically no military utility gained in the introduction of 
additional weapons, especially for states with a No First Use (NFU) policy. With this in 
mind, the introduction of nuclear weapons at sea could be read as a positive development, 
particularly between India and China. China has achieved an operational sea-based 
second-strike capability vis-à-vis India; if India can achieve mutual vulnerability with 
China via an SSBN fleet, it could be less inclined to pursue a larger land-based nuclear 
arsenal.11  
An assured second strike will not stabilize the India-Pakistan dyad, however. The 
main threat India faces from Pakistan is violent non-state actors, while Pakistan’s 
overriding fear is a conventional conflict that threatens Pakistan’s survival. Neither of 
these concerns is necessarily obviated by India’s possession of SLBMs. Should Pakistan 
acquire a triad in pursuit of parity with India, it is possible Pakistan could feel more 
secure about the survivability of its deterrent, and thus less likely to engage in arms 
racing behavior. It is more likely, however, that Pakistan would simply add sea-based 
weapons to its arsenal while continuing its pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons in hopes of 
deterring a Cold Start-style attack. Sea-based nuclear weapons dampen first-strike 
incentives and could thus promote crisis stability, but even today, with several dozen 
land-based nuclear weapons each, both India and Pakistan would be hard-pressed to 
eliminate their opponent’s entire arsenal in a first strike; their ISR and targeting 
capabilities are simply not up to the task of finding and destroying approximately  90 
warheads in one blow. Thus, they already face the possibility of a countervalue second 
strike. Basing nuclear weapons at sea would contribute only marginally to the goal of 
arsenal survivability, especially if the subs carrying them are noisy and easily found.  
The historical record of nuclear weapons at sea and their impact on crisis stability 
is murky at best, and it is here that the dangers of India’s pursuit of a sea-based deterrent 
are most pronounced. There are numerous risks inherent in sea-based nuclear arms, 
ranging from command and control failures to nuclear accidents to theft of fissile 
materials to crises that escalate to war. Schelling’s point regarding the possibility of a 
                                                 
11 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 69, no. 6 (2013): 79–85. 
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submarine-launched first strike should not be overlooked, particularly as it pertains to 
crisis stability. In the event of a crisis, fear of a bolt-from-the-blue countervalue first 
strike could incentivize India’s adversaries to target the Indian SSBN. This could create 
“use it or lose it” pressures for India: either India uses the warheads aboard the SSBN or 
it risks losing them to enemy ASW.  
Indeed, if states are unwilling to accept a position of mutual vulnerability, the 
introduction of an SSBN capability will generate demand for improved attack submarine 
fleets, either to protect the SSBNs or for ASW. There are numerous pathways by which 
submarines could be used provocatively without necessarily triggering an open conflict. 
Currently, there is little dialogue between India and Pakistan or China about how each 
side perceives naval, particularly subsurface, actions and how these states might mitigate 
worst-case thinking that could cause crises at sea to spiral. All three states are either 
actively building or acquiring additional SSNs and/or SSKs with AIP. Attack submarines 
provide the best ASW capability available, and are thus particularly worrisome from a 
crisis management perspective. As the quantity and quality of submarines in the IOR—
particularly those capable of carrying nuclear weapons or of tracking and killing other 
submarines—increases, there is a slim but growing danger of accidental or inadvertent 
escalation in both dyads.12  
Thus, while SSBNs may offer some added stability at the strategic or nuclear 
level, they may exacerbate conventional maritime arms races that could result in strategic 
effects via crisis escalation. In evaluating the impact of SSBNs on crisis stability, then, 
this thesis must also evaluate the problems improved fast attack submarine fleets may 
pose. While Western analysis tends to focus on their deterrent effect, submarines have 
historically been used to great effect for commerce raiding and naval blockades. Pakistan 
especially remains vulnerable to a blockade of Karachi, which occurred during the 1971 
                                                 
12 I follow John Mearsheimer’s definitions of inadvertent and accidental escalation: “‘Inadvertent 
escalation’ refers to deliberate nuclear escalation, ordered by national command authorities (NCAs) on one 
side, which is inadvertently provoked by actions of the other side. In contrast, ‘accidental escalation’ arises 
when individual commanders use nuclear weapons, in accordance with their rules of engagement, before 
NCAs on either side have decided to go to nuclear war.”  Given the limited technical skills and experience 
of these states’ submarine services, I also allow for the potential for mechanical failure and unauthorized 
use of weapons under the rubric of accidental escalation. John J. Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The 
Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 15n19. 
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War. This fear has led Pakistan to set economic strangulation as a red line that could 
generate a nuclear response. The peacetime use of submarines for commerce raiding is 
unlikely, but cannot be ruled out. Provocative behavior toward ballistic missile 
submarines could also generate risk of escalation. Relatively small fleet sizes mean that 
any given submarine is more valuable than its Cold War counterparts were, and it is 
unknown how India would react if its submarines were subject to ASW efforts.  
The crisis stability challenges posed by the introduction of Arihant are both 
external, as just described, and internal to India. The introduction of nuclear-powered 
submarines creates huge bureaucratic and cultural demands on their navies as they 
attempt to move away from diesel toward nuclear. There are significant technical and 
doctrinal issues that India has not addressed, at least publicly. The degradation of 
command and control is especially problematic for submarines: who retains launch 
authority if a submarine loses contact with the national command authority? India has a 
strong tradition of civilian control of the nuclear arsenal, and Indian nuclear weapons are 
believed to be kept demated and not available for immediate use. An SSBN, however, 
must carry both warheads and missiles. The logic of predelegation that plagues tactical 
nuclear weapons is relevant to SLBMs as well; one cannot avoid some level of 
predelegation if the system is to be effective, but predelegation introduces new 
opportunities for the misuse of weapons. India has not yet explained how it intends to 
retain active civilian control over its SLBM arsenal.  
This thesis should not be understood as an argument against sea-based deterrence; 
rather, it is an effort to understand when and how sea-based deterrence can bolster 
strategic stability. The Cold War is a single case, but many analysts and strategists have 
abstracted from it to create reductive principles that may not apply in all cases. I argue 
that SSBNs must be understood in their operational, bureaucratic, and technological 
contexts. Furthermore, discussing SSBNs without discussing ASW, specifically SSNs, is 
dangerous and leads to faulty conclusions about the security and credibility of a state’s 
second strike.  
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis draws on and synthesizes two primary literatures: nuclear deterrence 
in the maritime domain and India’s strategic relationship with Pakistan and China, with 
an emphasis on maritime security issues and nuclear deterrence.  
1. Nuclear Deterrence at Sea 
Sea-based deterrents received some attention during the latter half of the 20th 
century, but since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there have been no significant 
efforts to examine whether the stabilizing nature of the Cold War-era triad can be 
imputed to all nuclear rivalries. In the 1950s and 1960s, the literature on nuclear 
deterrence argued that sea-based nuclear weapons were a valuable addition to the effort 
to deter nuclear attacks by the Soviet Union via the threat of massive retaliation. In 
Strategy in the Missile Age, Bernard Brodie argued that nuclear submarines capable of 
launching Polaris missiles “would seem to be a desirable supplement to a well-protected, 
land-based force, even if it proved to be … a costlier method in relation to effects 
achieved.”13 Submarines, he noted, are hard to detect and thus difficult to target in a 
counterforce attack, leaving submarines free to retaliate in the event of a first strike. In an 
article discussing the possibilities for arms control, Thomas Schelling emphasized the 
importance of stabilizing deterrence, arguing that both sides had “a common interest in 
reducing the advantage of striking first, simply because that very advantage… increases 
the likelihood of war.”14 He noted that SSBNs could be either “peculiarly good at 
surviving and retaliating,” thereby making them a deterrent, or “peculiarly good at getting 
up close for a no-warning strike on an enemy’s retaliatory power,” and thus destabilizing, 
but generally concluded that submarines bolstered deterrence.15 In The Delicate Balance 
of Terror, Albert Wohlstetter cautioned against “[looking] for miracles” in new delivery 
                                                 
13 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 286. 
14 Thomas C. Schelling, “Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization,” Daedalus 89, no. 4 (1960): 
894. 
15 Ibid., 897. 
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systems, and laid out the hurdles any given system must overcome.16 He noted the 
command and control problem that SSBNs would face, but was generally positive about 
the mobility and stealth of the submarine as a stabilizing element. 
While the early Cold War nuclear strategists by and large concluded that the 
SSBN offered an assured second-strike capability that minimized the incentive for first 
use and thus stabilized deterrence, later writers acknowledged that this abstract ideal must 
be balanced against the reality that submarines presented significant potential for crisis 
instability. Barry Posen’s 1982 article, “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and 
NATO’s Northern Flank,” explored the idea that conventional operations in the vicinity 
of a Soviet SSBN bastion could generate escalatory pressure if these systems were 
threatened or targeted.17 Preemptive defensive actions by NATO could be considered 
offensive by the Soviets, particularly if strategic forces were in the line of fire.18 The fog 
of war would only compound the potential for inadvertent escalation. Desmond Ball also 
called out the relative inattention to the challenges of escalation control at sea, noting the 
reasons for the oversight and detailing a range of considerations that warrant greater 
analysis in South Asia, including accidents at sea, the attractiveness of ships as nuclear 
targets, the launch autonomy of naval commanders, and problems raised by dual-capable 
systems and platforms.19 John Mearsheimer argued that the U.S. Navy’s Maritime 
Strategy of the early 1980s, which called for a 600-ship navy capable of offensive action 
in Europe, did not contribute to deterrence stability. Rather, he concluded that the 
aggressiveness of the Navy’s posture may actually detract from deterrence in Europe, 
particularly the dangerous plan to use SSNs as counterforce assets to strike SSBNs early 
in a conventional war so as to shift the strategic balance.20 This was not intended to 
suggest that SSBNs were destabilizing, however; rather, Mearsheimer cautioned the 
                                                 
16 Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, P-1472 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1958), http://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html. 
17 Barry R. Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War?: Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank,” 
International Security 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 28. 
18 Ibid., 32. 
19 Desmond Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea,” International Security 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985): 3–31. 
20 Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep,” 5. 
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Navy not to take actions that could be interpreted as an attempt to erode the mutual 
vulnerability that created strategic stability. 
Outside the U.S.-Soviet dyad, no comprehensive theoretical work on the effect of 
sea-based deterrents on strategic stability has been done. There was little debate about the 
nuances of naval nuclear weapons through the 1990s and the early 2000s, beyond an 
article by Robert Glasser revisiting Schelling’s point that SSBNs could be used for 
decapitation strikes and therefore may be less stabilizing than previously thought.21 There 
has been a recent uptick in scholarly interest as a result of China’s advances in submarine 
technology, thought the problem has not yet been examined at the operational and tactical 
level as Mearsheimer and Posen did in the 1980s. Rather, the current analyses have 
focused on net assessment of China’s capabilities, its intentions for its submarine fleet, 
and the implications of these advances for the United States. There have been few 
rigorous attempts to determine how China’s SSBNs might impact the force postures or 
activities of various potential adversaries other than the United States.22  
India’s nuclearization of its fleet has attracted some limited scholarly attention, 
but all authors seem to proceed from the foundational assumption that SSBNs should 
generate strategic stability; their concerns are primarily related to the escalatory potential 
of crises. The most notable of this body of work is Iskander Rehman’s 2012 article, 
“Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship.” Focused on 
India and Pakistan, Rehman examined the motivations for the pursuit of sea-based 
nuclear weapons; these nations’ “dangerous path” of dual-use systems, cultivated 
                                                 
21 Robert D. Glasser, “Enduring Misconceptions of Strategic Stability: The Role of Nuclear Missile-
Carrying Submarines,” Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 1 (February 1992): 23–37. 
22 For force posture assessments, see Michael S. Chase, “China’s Transition to a More Credible 
Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States,” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2013): 69–
101. For net assessments and intentions, see Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: 
China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 161–96; Owen R. 
Cote, Jr., Assessing the Undersea Balance Between the U.S. and China, MIT Security Studies Program 
Working Paper (Cambridge, MA: MIT, February 2011), 
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/working_papers/Undersea%20Balance%20WP11-1.pdf; Sam Bateman, 
“Perils of the Deep: The Dangers of Submarine Proliferation in the Seas of East Asia,” Asian Security 7, 
no. 1 (2011): 61–84; Thomas M. Skypek, “China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative 
Futures for China’s SSBN Fleet,” in A Collection of Papers from the 2010 Nuclear Scholars Initiative 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010); Toshi Yoshihara and James R. 
Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010).  
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ambiguity, and brinkmanship; and the potential for regional destabilization and 
inadvertent escalation.23 In Yoshihara and Holmes’ Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age, 
Andrew Winner sketched the outlines of how India’s deployment of nuclear weapons at 
sea relates to its broader strategy.24 He explored how India’s SSBNs might impact 
deterrence with Pakistan and China, but did not delve into the interaction between crisis 
management and command and control issues. Winner argued that Arihant, armed with 
the K-15, “features characteristics that qualify it as a stabilizing agent in a nuclear dyad,” 
at least until longer-range missiles are available. He neglected, however, to consider fully 
the potential for incidents at sea to generate escalatory pressure, nor did he draw any 
general conclusions about the value of nuclear triads in the IOR or examine the 
implications of limited delivery systems. 
2. Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian Maritime and Nuclear Security 
Dynamics  
There has been a marked rise in scholarly interest in security dynamics in the 
Indian Ocean over the last decade as India and China have invested heavily in the 
development of their navies, though there has not yet been a sustained effort to analyze 
the underwater dimension of naval or nuclear security in the IOR. Nevertheless, such 
works as Robert Kaplan’s Monsoon, Bernard Cole’s Asian Maritime Strategies: 
Navigating Troubled Waters, Vijay Sakhuja’s Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century, 
and editors John Garofano and Andrea Dew’s Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The 
Indian Ocean and International Security argue for the renewed economic and 
geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean region, underscoring the importance of 
maintaining access to the global commons and freedom of maritime trade. Some of these 
works, particularly Part II of Deep Currents, touch on the potential for maritime conflict 
to generate broader regional instability, but none directly address how changes in the 
undersea domain could escalate horizontally.  
                                                 
23 Iskander Rehman, “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in 
the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 65. 
24 Andrew C. Winner, “The Future of India’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent,” in Strategy in the Second 
Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, ed. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012). 
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There is a rich literature on Indo-Pakistan nuclear security dynamics, which will 
underpin this thesis’s efforts to understand how naval nuclearization may alter the 
deterrent relationship between these countries. The overwhelming, if not exclusive, focus 
of this literature is land-based crises, however; there are few high-quality sources on the 
maritime dimensions of Indo-Pakistani relations, nuclear or otherwise, other than those 
noted in the previous section. Of the land-oriented analyses, Sumit Ganguly and Paul 
Kapur’s India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia is 
particularly valuable for this thesis. The authors present process-versus outcome-based 
approaches to the study of crises and why they do or do not escalate. The body of 
literature on escalation control in South Asian crises will be especially valuable, though 
again, it does not generally address escalation pathways for potential maritime crises. 
This literature has tended to concentrate on the possibility of limited conventional war 
under the nuclear umbrella, the stability-instability paradox, and the mechanisms by 
which land-based crises, particularly terrorist attacks, could escalate to nuclear 
exchanges.25  
The Sino-Indian nuclear relationship has also generated a body of work, though it 
is largely descriptive and less analytical or operationally-oriented than that of the India-
Pakistan dyad. It is generally understood that India’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons 
was driven in part by its experience in the disastrous 1962 Sino-Indian war, and concern 
about Chinese intentions has undergirded Indian nuclear thinking since then. The 
National Bureau of Asian Research’s Strategic Asia series has published several chapters 
that explore various elements of the evolving Sino-Indian deterrent relationship, but none 
                                                 
25 Examples include Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation 
Control in South Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2013); Manpreet Sethi, “Conventional War in the 
Presence of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Analysis 33, no. 3 (2009): 415–25; Forrest E. Morgan et al., 
Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2008); Feroz Hassan Khan, “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review 
10, no. 1 (2003): 59–74; Scott D. Sagan, Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security 
Studies, 2009); George Perkovich, The Non-Unitary Model And Deterrence Stability In South Asia 
(Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2012). 
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directly address the question of strategic stability via sea-based deterrence.26 Similarly 
Lora Saalman’s edited volume The China-India Nuclear Crossroads: China, India, and 
the New Paradigm, in which Chinese and Indian scholars analyze a wide range of aspects 
of the Sino-Indian deterrent relationship such as objectives for and beliefs about nuclear 
weapons, does not address the sea-based deterrence question.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In this thesis, I examine existing notions about the stabilizing effect of sea-based 
deterrents to determine what conditions supported strategic stability in the Cold War. 
This analysis will inform a closer look at how India’s pursuit of a ballistic missile 
submarine fleet might affect arms race stability and crisis stability vis-à-vis Pakistan and 
China. This thesis offers some predictions for the direction of regional politics should 
these countries’ submarine programs move forward. I use these dyads to evaluate the 
existing nuclear deterrence literature and theory regarding sea-based nuclear weapons. 
Close examination of the Indian Ocean rivalries and the assumptions underpinning the 
belief in SSBNs as stabilizing forces provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
deterrent value of these systems.  
I draw on a variety of sources, including scholarly journals, policy papers, 
newspaper articles, government reports, official histories and doctrines, and academic 
books on developments in submarine proliferation in the IOR and the historical and 
evolving deterrent relationships between India and China and India and Pakistan. In 
addition to the literatures discussed in Section Four, I will draw on such works as the 
2007 Indian Maritime Strategy document, Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime 
Military Strategy; Rear Admiral Raja Menon’s A Nuclear Strategy for India; and the 
Indian Navy’s official histories as source material on Indian thinking about nuclear 
weapons and their integration into maritime and naval strategy. I also engage the Cold 
                                                 
26 These include Gaurav Kampani, “India: The Challenges of Nuclear Operationalization and 
Strategic Stability,” in Asia in the Second Nuclear Age, ed. Ashley J Tellis, Abraham Denmark, and Travis 
Tanner, Strategic Asia 2013–14 (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013); Arun Sahgal, “China’s 
Military Modernization: Responses from India,” in China’s Military Challenge, ed. Ashley J Tellis and 
Travis Tanner, Strategic Asia 2012–13 (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012); as well as 
several chapters in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough, eds., Asia Responds to Its Rising 
Powers: China and India, Strategic Asia 2011–12 (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011). 
 16 
War-era literature on the history and role of sea-based nuclear weapons in the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship to explore the foundations of the belief in the stabilizing effect of nuclear-
armed submarines as well as the empirical realities.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into six chapters, including the introduction and 
conclusion. I begin with an in-depth discussion of the United States’ Cold War 
experience, which generated the intellectual underpinnings of the belief in the deterrent 
value of SSBNs. I use the empirics of the Cold War to clarify the conditions that 
contributed to stability in the U.S.-Soviet Union dyad. I first address the internal 
challenges the United States Navy had to overcome in order to make its delivery systems 
credible and reliable, and then I examine the issues of crisis stability and arms race 
stability during the Cold War. I then turn to India’s motivations for building an SSBN 
and discuss the progress they’ve made thus far. Following a discussion of India’s 
capabilities, I address the India-China dyad and the India-Pakistan dyad, focusing on 
arms race stability and crisis stability in each dyad. I conclude by exploring the 
implications of my findings both for the conventional wisdom about nuclear triads and 
regional security in the IOR.  
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II. DETERRING WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. 
During the Cold War, American and Soviet submarines chased one another across 
the North Atlantic. As naval nuclear propulsion technology matured, submarines gained 
the ability to stay underwater—and thus largely undetectable—for several months at a 
time while offering greater speed and a truly global reach. Fast attack submarines (SSNs) 
filled a range of roles, primarily ASW, defense of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, while fleets of ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBNs) offered the assurance of a second strike in the event of 
nuclear attack. That secure second-strike capability was thought to cement mutually 
assured destruction, thus stabilizing the U.S.-Soviet deterrent relationship.  
By the end of the Cold War, the idea that ballistic missile submarines provided a 
critical deterrent function had remained intact since its initial conception in the 1950s, 
and now forms one of the central assumptions of nuclear strategy: submarine-based 
deterrents are stabilizing and thus desirable. Unpacking this assumption and exploring 
whether it is indeed a universal truth requires a close examination of the history of the 
U.S.-Soviet dyad. As will be demonstrated, the gains to strategic stability provided by 
SSBNs during the Cold War came with the increased potential for crisis instability and 
accidental or inadvertent escalation. Furthermore, SSBNs appeared to do little to restrain 
the broader strategic arms race, either in terms of warheads or delivery systems. 
This section examines the Cold War-era theoretical foundations of sea-based 
nuclear deterrence as well as the development of the American nuclear fleet and the 
changes to America’s submarine culture and force posture. I trace the development of the 
belief in the value of the nuclear triad alongside the development of the ballistic missile 
submarine. I then present an alternate explanation for the U.S.’s embrace of the nuclear 
triad by exploring the Cold War history of the U.S. Navy and its efforts to retain 
bureaucratic power and strategic significance in an era characterized by a belief in air 
power and fears of ground invasion. The accession of nuclear powered submarines into 
the fleet required significant cultural changes within the U.S. Navy and generated 
substantial changes to its ASW strategies, both of which were critical to the stabilization 
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of deterrence during the Cold War. In the following section, I investigate several 
examples where submarines exacerbated crises or could have generated inadvertent 
escalation, culminating in a discussion of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. I conclude 
with a discussion of the effects that the introduction of SSBNs had on arms race stability 
and proliferation of undersea warfare assets. 
The historical analysis presented here will demonstrate that contrary to popular 
assumptions, sea-based deterrence had serious flaws from the outset. The four major 
challenges detailed earlier—bureaucratic and organizational change, the advancement of 
ASW, operational and geostrategic realities, and naval and nuclear doctrine and 
strategy—were present in varying degrees throughout the Cold War. The subsidiary list 
of problems was long and troubling: problems of predelegation and command and 
control; the potential for aggressive ASW behavior to generate inadvertent escalation; the 
potential for accidents at sea to be perceived as intentional and therefore to be considered 
escalatory; doctrinal mismatches between adversaries; the fear of bolt-from-the-blue 
attacks delivered by submarine; and, until the early 1970s, no shared framework for 
responding to incidents at sea.27 These same problems may reappear in the IOR, as will 
be explored in subsequent chapters; indeed, given the players’ complicated histories and 
growing asymmetries in military capacity, these problems are like to be even more 
pronounced in the South Asian context. Far from offering hope for South Asia, the Cold 
War illustrates the range of challenges faced by nations operating sea-based deterrents.   
A. DETERRENCE THEORY AND THE NUCLEAR TRIAD 
After the detonation of the first thermonuclear device in 1952, the central 
challenge for nuclear strategists lay in devising a way to prevent a catastrophic first 
strike. The solution was the development of a secure second-strike capability that would 
engender deterrence by punishment. Any first strike would be assured of a retaliatory 
nuclear response, which would theoretically outweigh any benefits to be gained by 
striking first and thus make a first strike less likely. As long as a preemptive strike could 
destroy the enemy’s entire nuclear force before the enemy could respond, or at least limit 
                                                 
27 Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea.” 
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the potential for retaliation by significantly eroding an enemy’s second-strike capability, 
a first strike could remain an attractive option for military planners. Strategic stability, 
which would be achieved when neither side had an incentive to go first, could only be 
possible with an assured second-strike capability. Strategic assets either had to be 
hardened so as to be more difficult to destroy or they had to be mobile and concealable so 
they would be difficult to target. The goal was to ensure that the first mover could not be 
sure they had eliminated the threat of retaliation. The cost of failing to destroy the 
adversary’s nuclear arsenal through a counterforce first strike was high, the logic went; 
no rational actor would risk it if it was difficult to find and destroy the weapons. Bombers 
offered mobility, of course, but getting them in the air before a first strike could land 
would require sufficient advanced warning of incoming missiles—a serious technological 
challenge at the time. 
In the early 1950s, inter-service battles raged in the Pentagon over who would 
control America’s new atomic weapons—and, by extension, who would receive 
budgetary primacy and control of an important new component of national strategy. In 
1954, President Eisenhower established the Technological Capabilities Panel of the 
Science Advisory Committee, chaired by James R. Killian, to determine the optimal 
make-up of the national nuclear force. The Killian Report, forwarded to the president in 
1955, recommended a three-pronged approach to the development of nuclear missiles: 
prioritize development of the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), develop an 
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), and develop an IRBM that could be 
launched from a ship at sea. Ballistic missiles at sea would be hard to find and target in a 
hypothetical first strike, and could thus provide the assured second strike that ensured 
strategic stability. Submarines were especially hard to detect, and could maintain a 
reserve of weapons at sea that would be secure from a first strike.  
This logic was enshrined in the deterrence literature that developed in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Many of the leading intellectual lights of the era supported the idea of SSBNs 
as a positive development in the search for deterrence stability. The need for a second-
strike capability was paramount, as neither side could feel secure without it. Bernard 
Brodie argued that even if their cost-to-effect ratio was higher than a land-based asset, 
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submarines armed with Polaris missiles were a valuable addition to the arsenal for their 
ability to assure a second strike.28 Thomas Schelling warned that submarines could seem 
more threatening to an adversary—submarines could potentially approach enemy 
territory without being detected, thus providing less warning time during a counterforce 
first strike—but on balance believed SSBNs could provide the assured retaliation 
capability that would ameliorate the first-strike advantage dilemma.29 Albert Wohlstetter 
also looked favorably on the SSBN, though he noted the command and control problem 
that SSBNs would face.30  
The push toward submarine-based nuclear weapons was not without opposition 
within the Navy, but as congressional pressure mounted and national intelligence 
estimates warned of the Soviets’ progress in guided missile development, the Eisenhower 
administration ordered the military to begin work on these three recommendations. While 
the Air Force believed that any war with the Soviet Union would be vanishingly short 
and carried out by strategic bombing, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke 
argued for more flexibility in limiting the scope of conflict. He perceived that a total 
nuclear war would be self-defeating, and saw a role for the Navy in deterring, rather than 
fighting, nuclear war under a concept of “finite deterrence.”31 Burke also saw that 
deterrence required not an endlessly large supply of nuclear weapons, a goal the Air 
Force seemed intent on pursuing, but instead a secure arsenal that would be available 
when needed. As George Baer explained, “A mobile, concealed, second-strike retaliatory 
missile force, of which the sea-based Polaris was the exemplar, would be sized not to hit 
every target imaginable, nor to win a war—a false goal in the nuclear age—but to have 
deterrence value alone. This force could be small if it were hidden and invulnerable.”32 
The Polaris missile, the solid-fuel, sea-based IRBM promoted by the Killian Report, 
would thus take center stage for the Navy.  
                                                 
28 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 286. 
29 Schelling, “Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization.” 
30 Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror. 




In 1955, Burke appointed Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., to oversee the 
development of the Polaris missile. Polaris enabled the Navy to break the Air Force’s 
stranglehold on strategy and resources, but its development came at the expense of other 
shipbuilding and maintenance projects. It also required the Navy to embrace countervalue 
targeting, which it had earlier condemned as unlikely to produce a political victory worth 
winning. Nevertheless, the Navy proceeded with the development of Polaris alongside 
the development of the nuclear submarine under Rear Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, 
whose first boat, USS Nautilus, went to sea in January 1955. By 1961, USS George 
Washington, a converted nuclear attack submarine, had successfully launched the Polaris 
from underwater, and was sent to sea with a full complement of missiles. The next class 
of SSBNs, the Ethan Allen, was commissioned into the fleet in August 1961; within 20 
years, the Navy was operating 41 ballistic missile submarines. 
B. BUREAUCRATIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE  
In developing the nuclear submarine force, the U.S. Navy had to undergo two 
major shifts in culture and mindset in order to make the SSBN a reliable delivery system: 
the diesel-to-nuclear transition and the inculcation of a culture of safety. The criticality of 
these cultural shifts cannot be overstated; as Rear Admiral Dave Oliver blunts stated, 
“Culture needs to adjust when technology changes. Otherwise people die 
unnecessarily.”33 The speed and power offered by nuclear propulsion gave the Navy new 
capabilities and new missions, but these benefits came with substantially more complex 
and more dangerous operational and engineering problems. The Navy had to overcome 
the old guard’s attachment to time-tested processes that were either unnecessary or 
downright dangerous for nuclear submarines. The introduction of nuclear submarines 
also demanded greater attention to safety and engineering; given the areas and depths in 
which these boats operated, it would be unlikely that a rescue operation could succeed, 
making it all the more important that accidents were prevented. These cultural changes 
were critical to the success of the nuclear submarine fleet over the next half-century, but 
both were hard-won.  
                                                 
33 Dave Oliver, Against the Tide: Rickover’s Leadership Principles and the Rise of the Nuclear Navy 
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 40. 
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1. The Cultural Transition from Diesel to Nuclear 
While the development of the Polaris missile went relatively smoothly, the path to 
a secure, reliable delivery system was littered with pitfalls and problems. With the 
introduction of naval nuclear reactors, the submarine force had to radically—and 
rapidly—alter its standard operating procedures after decades of experience with diesel 
submarines. Admiral Oliver recalled an incident in the mid-1960s when a common 
standard operating procedure for a diesel boat nearly resulted in a hydrogen explosion 
aboard the SSBN USS George Washington Carver. At the time of the incident, 
submarine captains would order “Condition Baker” to be set when coming to periscope 
depth. Diesel submarines must spend much of their time operating near the surface to 
snorkel and recharge their batteries, increasing the likelihood of collision with surface 
ships. The design of diesel boats ensured that if any single watertight compartment was 
breached, the submarine would remain buoyant enough to survive. Under Condition 
Baker, all watertight compartments were to be immediately closed, thus ensuring survival 
in the event of a collision. To a diesel-trained crew, setting Condition Baker and charging 
the batteries were not at odds. When charging the batteries aboard a nuclear submarine, 
however, closing the compartments prevents hydrogen from circulating throughout the 
ship and creates a buildup of hydrogen in the battery well. At 8 percent, hydrogen 
spontaneously combusts with oxygen, creating enough heat to destroy the submarine. 
Luckily, Carver escaped that fate, but despite a missive to higher headquarters decrying 
Condition Baker for nuclear submarines, Oliver found that Nautilus continued to set 
Baker when he arrived three years later.34 Oliver contends that diesel submariners and 
engineers generally preferred to ignore such problems rather than enact the necessary 
organizational changes.35 He posits that USS Scorpion, which sunk under unknown 
circumstances near the Azores in 1968, may have been lost as a result of practices left 
over from the diesel era.  
The change from a diesel to nuclear force was organizationally and professionally  
difficult, and required the iron-willed leadership of Admiral Hyman Rickover. Admiral 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 41–44. 
35 Ibid., 45. 
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Rickover had promoted naval nuclear propulsion since its inception and was both the 
head of the Navy’s nuclear propulsion program as well as the head of the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s naval reactors division.36 This dual-hatting gave Rickover unparalleled 
control over the nuclear submarine program; as Admiral William Crowe, Jr., described it, 
“He fathered the nuclear program, and never afterward relinquished the slightest 
authority over it.”37 To the submarine force, it was clear early on that the nuclear 
submarine was the future; Crowe recounts his squadron commander telling him in 1962 
that “Everybody in [the nuclear training program], their lives are going to be wonderful. 
They’re all going to make flag and they’re all going to heaven.”38 Rickover personally 
controlled who was allowed to serve aboard nuclear submarines, and he expressly 
preferred candidates without submarine experience to those with diesel experience. This 
forced many younger diesel-trained submariners out of the force, engendering significant 
resentment on the part of those who remained. The elimination of diesel culture as 
“wrenching and painful to personal and professional relationships” but ultimately, “a 
necessary and farsighted tactic in Rickover’s overall strategy to remake the Navy.”39  
2. A Culture of Safety 
The diesel to nuclear culture shift was accompanied by the recognition of the new 
dangers associated with nuclear submarines and the need for increased attention to safety. 
For the U.S. Navy, USS Thresher stands as an enduring reminder of the criticality of 
rigorous submarine safety procedures. On 10 April 1963, during a deep-diving exercise in 
the North Atlantic, Thresher was lost along with her entire crew of 129 men. Thresher 
was the lead boat of her class of advanced nuclear attack submarines; in 1964, Vice 
Admiral Grenfell described her as “the fastest, deepest-diving, quietest, and best-armed 
submarine ever delivered as an operating warship to any fleet.”40 Despite her 
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technological advancements, however, Thresher was unable to recover from a 
mechanical failure on board that resulted in flooding and loss of propulsion. An attempt 
to blow the emergency ballast tanks for a rapid ascent failed, and on 11 April, Chief of 
Naval Operations George W. Anderson, Jr., officially declared the Thresher to be lost. A 
Navy court conducted extensive investigations into the disaster, ultimately producing 
1,718 classified pages. Congress undertook its own investigation, producing a 200-page 
report.41   
As Dean Golembeski wrote in 1997, “what the investigations discovered, aside 
from the specifics of the disaster, was a catastrophic failure in the Navy’s basic approach 
to design, development, and testing. They pointed up a critical need for the creation and 
implementation of engineering standards that would be strictly observed, especially in the 
design and construction of complex and technologically sophisticated systems.”42 In 
designing Thresher, different engineering standards had been applied to the nuclear and 
non-nuclear components. As Grenfell noted a year after the incident, “The modern deep-
diving submarine has advanced so fast that our rescue and salvage capability has dropped 
far behind, and it will probably be some years before we have even a rescue capability at 
the crush depths of the new submarine hulls. We therefore must do the best we can to 
insure the submarine’s ability to save herself.”43  
In 1964, in response to Thresher’s loss, the Navy established the Submarine 
Safety Program (SUBSAFE). SUBSAFE was charged with ensuring the safety of the 
fleet in all phases of a submarine’s life cycle, with an emphasis on preventing and 
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recovering from flooding; mission success was not to be treated as a priority, but rather a 
side benefit. In the years since SUBSAFE was established, only one U.S. Navy 
submarine, the non-SUBSAFE-certified Scorpion, has been lost at sea. Additionally, 
among other tasks, the newly-established Submarine Safety Center in Groton, 
Connecticut was responsible for the development of a safety manual and new training 
plans. It also collected and shared information on submarine accidents and incidents, with 
the intent of creating a culture of transparency and accountability within the fleet. 
Hyman Rickover’s single-minded attention to safety was a driving force in the 
Americans’ ability to field a safe, secure nuclear submarine force. Even before the loss of 
Thresher, Rickover recognized the shortcoming of diesel engineering for naval nuclear 
reactors and implemented new standards for components and parts that would come into 
contact with the reactor. In 1961, for example, Rickover demanded that “all nuclear 
systems exposed to seawater be fully welded instead of silver brazed, that all saltwater 
systems be fabricated to the same standards as the rest of the reactor plant, and that all 
joints and piping passing through the reactor compartment be welded” rather than 
brazed.44 Rear Admiral Dave Oliver credits Rickover’s active leadership with driving the 
necessary cultural changes:  
I am convinced that despite the unrelenting personal attacks on him, 
without Rickover insisting upon dramatic change, many more of us would 
have died while building the nuclear-submarine force. As Rickover 
commented in testifying about the Thresher disaster, “Our problem is in 
the submarine staffs where nearly all of the people are nonnuclear people, 
some of whom have a deep resentment against the nuclear navy because it 
has put them out of business.”45 
The establishment of SUBSAFE improved the reliability and safety of the 
submarine fleet, but the transition from a diesel to nuclear fleet was rocky and required 
significant changes to training procedures, operational practices, and, most importantly, 
to the mindset of the submarine force. Without these two cultural shifts, however, the 
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U.S. Navy would have struggled to field either a credible sea-based deterrent or an attack 
submarine fleet that could monitor and track the Soviets’ maritime activities.  
C. ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC ASW  
The naval nuclear reactor program was not specifically intended as a counter to 
the fear that the Soviets were installing nuclear weapons on their submarines; rather, 
Rickover pursued naval nuclearization because nuclear powered submarines would be 
less vulnerable to enemy ASW efforts. As Owen Cote, Jr., documents extensively in The 
Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet 
Submarines, developments in ASW technology and doctrines spurred developments in 
submarine technology in an ongoing battle for undersea dominance. Even the early 
nuclear submarines demonstrated the inadequacy of existing ASW capabilities and 
doctrines. When the U.S. Navy’s ASW forces first encountered Nautilus in exercises in 
1955, they were completed outmatched, and Nautilus was able to make simulated attacks 
on 16 ships. According to Cote,  
[Nautilus] was hard to find because she never had to snorkel and so fast 
that active sonars couldn’t keep their beams focused on her. Her speed and 
three dimensional maneuverability also allowed her to simply outrun 
existing homing torpedoes, the design basis threat for which was a 
snorkeling diesel traveling at no more than 8 knots and maneuvering in 
only two dimensions. In short, she completely undermined almost all the 
ASW progress made in the previous 10 years.46 
The one saving grace for efforts to detect nuclear submarines was, and remains, the noise 
factor. The constant operation of reactor coolant pumps and other machinery meant that 
early nuclear submarines were extremely loud compared to the diesel boats that had 
preceded them. Discoveries in low-frequency sound propagation in the early 1950s led to 
the implementation of the U.S. Navy’s Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), a network 
of seabed arrays deployed to listen for submarines. Nuclear submarines gave greater 
urgency to the development of passive acoustic measures and the advancement of hunter-
killer SSNs and air-based ASW assets. By 1958, when the Soviet Union began to field its 
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first complement of nuclear submarines—the Hotel-class SSBNs, Echo-class SSGNs, and 
November-class SSNs, colloquially known as the HENS—the U.S. Navy had an ASW 
advantage that allowed the U.S. to keep tabs on Soviet submarine movements. SOSUS 
could detect the early nuclear submarines at extreme distances; the first SOSUS array to 
detect a Soviet submarine crossing the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap was located in 
Barbados.47 SOSUS arrays improved dramatically over the next several decades; in the 
late 1980s, there were reports that the Navy could locate a submarine within a radius of 
about 90 kilometers, an area searchable by a single P-3C Orion ASW aircraft.48   
While Rickover may not have originally intended his nuclear submarine force to 
concern itself with counterforce missions against Soviet SSBNs, the Navy’s pursuit of 
improved ASW and counter-ASW capabilities highlights the reality that the introduction 
of SSBNs generates demand for conventional assets. Qualitative improvements in 
submarine technology create demand for improved ASW abilities, and vice versa. Over 
the next several decades, both the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy invested heavily in 
quieting technology for their submarines as well as in improved ASW capabilities 
intended to track and, if necessary, kill their adversary. In the 1960s, the U.S. adopted a 
barrier strategy, in which SOSUS arrays could alert forward-deployed SSNs and air 
assets when Soviet submarines crossed certain chokepoints, such as the GIUK gap. 
According to Cote, however, 
The main challenges to the U.S. Navy’s ASW posture… turned out not to 
be the one that was most feared—the truly quiet nuclear submarine. 
Instead, the Navy was surprised to varying degrees during this period by 
fast, deep-diving submarines (Alfa and Papa); submerged launch, antiship 
missile submarines (Charlie I and II SSGNs); and the long-range, ballistic 
missile submarines (Delta SSBNs).49  
Introduced in 1973, the Delta SSBN was especially threatening because it did not 
have to leave Soviet waters to pose a threat to the American homeland. The Deltas 
carried the R-29 (in NATO parlance, SS-N-8) family of missiles. These 3,500-4,500 mile 
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range SLBMs “caused a fundamental shift in the U.S. Navy’s approach to strategic ASW, 
one that caused a major expansion in the role of its SSN force.”50 Until the Delta, the 
U.S. had been relatively confident in its ability to find and target Soviet submarines. The 
ranges of the earlier generations of Soviet SLBMs were such that the delivery systems 
would have to pass through one or more ASW barriers in order to launch an attack on the 
United States. The Deltas, however, did not have to pass any ASW barriers to pose a 
threat. Furthermore, because they could stay within range of Soviet air defense batteries, 
they required a different ASW posture if they were to be held at risk. Initially, the Navy 
made the conscious choice to avoid offensive operations near the Deltas’ patrol regions. 
Later, however, the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s enshrined an alternate strategy in 
which Soviet SSBNs would be targeted early in a crisis. Only SSNs could perform this 
mission, and “this fact was reflected in both force structure and platform design 
decisions… culminating in the 100 SSN force requirement of the 600 ship navy, and the 
design of the USS Seawolf.”51 As this history demonstrates, ASW advances generate 
demand for improvements in submarine technology, and vice versa. As neither side could 
accept vulnerability to the other’s ASW, the arms race in undersea warfare assets was 
gradual and incremental but persistent throughout the Cold War. 
For the Cold War adversaries, the quantity of submarines in the fleet could make 
up for any potential loss to ASW efforts, accidents, or bureaucratic or organizational 
failures. As will be discussed further in Chapter IV, these challenges will loom much 
larger for India. With such a small fleet planned, India will be even more reliant on 
individual boats, making losses that much more unacceptable. The role of cultural change 
and the interplay between ASW and advances in submarine technology is an 
understudied but important element in evaluating the deterrent value of a fleet of nuclear-
armed submarines.  
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III. COURTING DISASTER DURING THE COLD WAR 
Moving beyond the internal challenges the U.S. Navy faced during the Cold War, 
this chapter chronologically addresses the U.S.-Soviet dyad and the four main problems 
associated with the introduction of SSBNs that are woven through the story of the Cold 
War. I focus primarily on three phases or moments of the Cold War that exemplify these 
problems in action: the Cuban Missile Crisis, naval parity in the 1970s and the Incidents 
at Sea Agreement, and the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. While the early Cold War 
nuclear strategists by and large concluded that the SSBN offered an assured second-strike 
capability that minimized the incentive for first use and thus stabilized deterrence, it later 
became clear that this abstract ideal must be balanced against the reality that the 
submarines presented significant potential for crisis instability. The logic of deterrence 
made sense on the surface, but it failed to account for technological progress, the 
operationalization of the U.S.’s containment policy toward the Soviet Union, and the 
Navy’s bureaucratic and cultural preference for an active role in national strategy. This 
history clearly illustrates that bureaucratic practices and preferences, the interplay of 
ASW and strategic assets, the areas in which these assets operate, and national naval and 
nuclear doctrine and strategy can have a serious impact on crisis stability and arms race 
stability. 
A. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
The first intimation of the potential for nuclear-armed submarines to generate 
inadvertent escalation came during the Cuban Missile Crisis, though it was not well 
understood at the time. The discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 prompted the 
Kennedy administration to institute a selective naval blockade of the island. Kennedy and 
Secretary of Defense McNamara preferred a proportional approach and careful crisis 
management, which required the blockade be conducted only against ships carrying 
weapons and delivery systems; food, oil, and other goods would be allowed to pass. The 
Navy successfully isolated Cuba through a combination of air and naval assets. No Soviet 
ships attempted to run the blockade, and any freighters that might have been carrying 
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missiles turned away before reaching the line in the sea. Within days, Khrushchev had 
announced he would withdraw the missiles from Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis ended 
peacefully, and the general conclusion was that deterrence had worked.  
While one could focus on the positive outcome—there was no nuclear 
exchange—a process-based approach, through which one examines the processes by 
which a crisis develops, shows the potential for disaster that lurked underwater.52 An 
outcome-oriented approach overlooks the dangers inherent in operating nuclear-armed 
submarines near enemy ships, and the Cuban Missile Crisis provides a clear example of 
the potential for inadvertence resulting from predelegation and communication 
challenges. During this period, four Soviet Foxtrot-class diesel attack submarines were 
operating in the area around Cuba. Deployed from the Soviet Northern Fleet to establish 
a submarine base at Mariel in Cuba, these four submarines were loaded with both 
conventional and nuclear-tipped torpedoes. They had departed the Soviet Union on 
October 1, a full two weeks before the United States discovered the missiles in Cuba, and 
their commanders had been given the authority to decide whether to use nuclear weapons 
in the event they came under attack.53 
On October 24, the U.S. Navy issued a notice via the State Department to “other 
Governments” that detailed the procedures the Navy would follow in surfacing and 
identifying submarines operating near the quarantined area. These procedures included 
dropping “four or five harmless explosive sound signals” which would indicate to 
submerged submarines that they should surface and be identified.54 According to a 
December 1962 Soviet report enumerating the experiences of these submarines, however, 
“practically on every bandwidth, interference transmitters were turned on at the start of 
transmission of information from Moscow, which resulted in delays of reception of 
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orders from the Headquarters of the Navy from several hours to a full day.”55 The Soviet 
commanders reported never having received the Navy’s notice.  
The Soviet report further noted that once the first submarine had been discovered 
after surfacing to repair its failed diesel engines, ASW activity was increased. The 
remaining three submarines were pursued vigorously, and only one managed to evade 
pursuit and avoid surfacing. Most troublingly from a crisis management perspective, the 
report states that 
In the course of search and pursuit of the submarines by anti-submarine 
warfare forces, [the U.S. Navy] actively used explosive sources [sic] of the 
location systems “Julie-Jezebel,” the blasts of which are impossible to 
distinguish from explosions of depth bombs. It is possible that depth 
bombs were actually used because three of the submarines suffered 
damage to the parts of radio systems antennas, which made reception and 
transmission of information substantially more difficult.56 
While understandable from a tactical perspective, the Navy’s aggressive action 
against the nuclear-armed Soviet submarines, including firing torpedoes and an attempted 
ramming, introduced the potential for inadvertent escalation. The degradation of the 
submarines’ communication capabilities meant that Moscow could not exercise effective 
command and control of its submarines even as it attempted to keep the crisis from 
spiraling into nuclear war. Ryurik Ketov, captain of one of the Soviet submarines in the 
Sargasso Sea, later reported that “mere chance” prevented one commander from resorting 
to nuclear weapons under fire: “A delay in diving time and the prudence of the brigade’s 
Chief of Staff Vasilii Arkhipov—who happened to be on board—prevented the combat 
operations which the B-59 could have initiated.”57 Those operations would have involved 
the use of nuclear torpedoes against U.S. Navy ships during a delicate and tense political 
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situation. It is not hard to imagine that their use could have been perceived as 
intentionally escalatory rather than defensive.  
The Cuban Missile Crisis accords with normal accident theory, which concludes 
that complex organizations will inevitably experience accidents as a result of 
organizational inconsistency and incomplete knowledge; humans are fallible and may not 
recognize contradictory policies in their organizations, particularly when under stress.58 
Though the outcome was, on balance, positive, the Cuban Missile Crisis also underscores 
the dangers posed by insufficient attention to naval doctrine and strategy; for the U.S. 
Navy, enforcing the blockade took precedence over higher-order concerns about 
maintaining crisis stability. Rather than nuclear-armed submarines engendering caution in 
either the U.S. Navy or the Soviet Union, this episode suggests that neither party gave 
serious consideration to the potential for inadvertent escalation as a result of aggressive 
ASW efforts or the command and control problems that would be faced by national 
control authorities and submarine commanders under hostile conditions. As the Indian 
Navy grows and gains bureaucratic power, India will need to match naval and nuclear 
strategy carefully to ensure it does not make the same mistake in the IOR. 
B. NAVAL PARITY IN THE 1970S AND INCIDENTS AT SEA 
By the end of the 1960s, the Soviets had achieved a submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM) alongside the development of the Yankee-class SSBN, which had greater 
mobility and could strike coastal targets. As noted earlier, in 1973 the Soviet Union 
fielded the R-29/SS-N-8 intercontinental ballistic missile aboard the Delta-I class 
submarines, which gave them the ability to hit any target in the continental United States, 
thus providing the Soviets with an assured second-strike capability. Unlike the 
Americans, the Soviets opted to keep their SSBNs close to home and under the protection 
of air defense assets in the Kola Peninsula. As Baer notes, by “withholding their power in 
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order to have decisive force on hand to influence a postwar settlement … the Soviet 
SSBNs did not have to expose themselves to enemy hunters at all.”59 
Through the 1970s, Soviet naval strategy became more active as more and better 
ships were built. The head of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, was committed 
to standing against “the ocean strategy of imperialism”60 Within the broad American 
defense strategic community, there was debate about whether the Soviet policy was 
intended to be aggressive or was simply defensive and designed to reach parity with the 
United States. The Soviets’ lack of clarity about doctrine led to misperceptions and 
confusion within the United States defense community. The U.S. Navy, for its part, 
looked at Soviet capabilities and saw a clear threat to sea lines of communication. During 
the Cold War, the Navy’s fear had little strategic effect—the broader strategic community 
continued to believe that any military conflict with the Soviet Union would be too short 
for SLOCs to matter much to the war effort. Had there been greater concern for SLOC 
security, however, it is likely that the U.S.’s ASW assets would have received significant 
additional resources. In South Asia, particularly between Pakistan and India, SLOC 
security is less of an immediate concern in a crisis, but the same principle applies: if the 
state fears its adversary’s naval strategy to be aggressive, it will endeavor to equip itself 
for that fight, with potentially deleterious effects on crisis stability.  
Throughout the rest of the 1970s, the Navy struggled with questions of mission, 
force structure, and strategic focus. Old ships were scrapped even as inflation made new 
ships unaffordable, and the fleet shrunk alarmingly. The only platforms spared from this 
process of downsizing were the nuclear submarines. The SSBN fleet held steady at 41, 
while the SSN fleet grew to 61 ships by the mid-1970s. As American ships aged and 
funds could not be found to replace them, the Navy saw itself facing a formidable foe and 
cautioned political leaders not to exert diplomatic pressure in areas where the local Soviet 
forces outnumbered the U.S. Navy, lest the United States be forced to back down as the 
Soviets had in Cuba.  
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In 1972, the U.S.-Soviet Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas 
Agreement (commonly referred to as the Incidents at Sea Agreement) was signed amid 
concerns about increasing naval parity. The threat posed by the Soviet fleet forced the 
Navy to consider whether it would be able to control escalation to nuclear use in the 
event of a conflict or confrontation. The Soviets also acknowledged the potential for 
escalation as a result of accidents or aggressive tactics that led to open fire. The U.S. 
Department of State describes the Incidents at Sea Agreement as a confidence-building 
measure, and notes that as such, “[it] does not directly affect the size, weaponry, or force 
structure of the parties. Rather, it serves to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding 
of military activities; to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or 
the failure of communication; and to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis.”61 
Through the Incidents at Sea Agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union 
committed to following the “rules of the road” that governed ship movements in 
international waters. In addition to the general Article II commitment regarding the 
observation of established international regulations, Article III presented a list of specific 
agreements designed to ensure that ambiguous actions by military vessels would not be 
misinterpreted as hostile or escalatory. Per the U.S. Department of State, “the agreement 
provides for: 
 steps to avoid collision; 
 not interfering in the “formations” of the other party; 
 avoiding maneuvers in areas of heavy sea traffic; 
 requiring surveillance ships to maintain a safe distance from the object of 
investigation so as to avoid ‘embarrassing or endangering the ships under 
surveillance’; 
 using accepted international signals when ships maneuver near one 
another; 
 not simulating attacks at, launching objects toward, or illuminating the 
bridges of the other party’s ships; 
                                                 
61 Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, “Incidents at 
Sea Agreement,” Other Release, U.S. Department of State, (January 1, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm. 
 35 
 informing vessels when submarines are exercising near them; and 
 requiring aircraft commanders to use the greatest caution and prudence in 
approaching aircraft and ships of the other party and not permitting 
simulated attacks against aircraft or ships, performing aerobatics over 
ships, or dropping hazardous objects near them.”62 
Over time, the Incidents at Sea Agreement led to a reduction in collisions and near 
collisions, according to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman.63 For South Asia, a similar 
agreement may be appropriate in the coming years. Confidence-building measures such 
as a shared framework for interpreting and addressing naval encounters could help 
mitigate the crisis instability problems generated by small fleet sizes, lack of experience 
with naval nuclear propulsion, and growing ASW arsenals.  
C. THE MARITIME STRATEGY OF THE 1980S 
The end of the 1970s had seen the Navy fruitlessly arguing the need for offensive 
sea power against a national strategy that saw naval power as broadly useless for the 
expected war in Germany, which would be too short for the Navy to get involved. In the 
1980s, however, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Jr. and the successive Chiefs of 
Naval Operations (CNOs) Admirals Thomas Hayward and James Watkins constructed a 
case for offensive power that relied on a new concept for war with the Soviet Union. The 
Maritime Strategy of the 1980s and the criticisms leveled against it clearly highlight the 
importance of naval strategy in maintaining arms race and crisis stability. George Baer 
states: 
Hayward, Watkins, and Lehman moved the Navy’s missions away from 
NATO-centered, reactive sea control and limited Third World 
interventionism toward a worldwide offensive in a general war. The Navy 
hoped that in such a war it would be able to achieve a related shift—that 
of national strategy away from a sharp, nuclear conflict on the European 
central front, toward a long, conventional maritime war of global scope. 
Such a maritime strategy would recommit the Navy to power-projection 
missions of direct air-and-amphibious support in a European land war, as 
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well as to offensive sea control through aggressive antisubmarine 
warfare.64  
Such an offensive maritime strategy would, its planners believed, allow the 
United States to redefine the nature of a potential war with the Soviet Union by keeping 
the war conventional and expanding it beyond the borders of Europe. In the first 
moments of a war, the Navy would be on the offensive against the Soviet Union, most 
notably against its SSBN forces. By closing access to the oceans and destroying the 
Soviet fleets in port, the Navy believed it could win the war. This reconnection of sea 
control to power projection promoted by Lehman and the CNOs provided justification for 
budgetary increases as the Reagan administration beefed up defense budgets. It also 
offered an alternative to the consensus view that the war would be fought in Germany 
and would be over quickly.  
Nevertheless, the maritime strategy attracted its share of critics, who attacked its 
fundamental assumption that a general war with the Soviet Union could stay below the 
nuclear threshold. The Navy believed the Soviet Union would refrain from using nuclear 
weapons in the early phases of a war, thereby giving it time to decimate the SSBN fleet. 
This was unknowable, however, and many strategists saw it as an unfounded assumption 
that was adopted because it gave the Navy space to argue its preferred positions. 
There was also a growing recognition that escalation to the use of nuclear 
weapons may not be a rational, calculated decision on either side. Barry Posen’s 1982 
article “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank” argued that 
“intense conventional operations may cause nuclear escalation by threatening or 
destroying strategic nuclear forces.”65 Posen noted the “fine line between offensive and 
defensive acts,” explaining that while destruction of Soviet submarines may be 
considered defensive by a NATO attack submarine, the Soviet Union might determine 
such destruction to be the first volley in an offensive campaign, particularly if the 
destroyed sub was an SSBN.66 The fog of war would only compound the potential for 
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inadvertent escalation. That the Navy had clearly stated its desire to hunt and kill SSBNs 
would lend further weight to the Soviet calculation that any accident must be an 
intentional first strike against its strategic reserve. The fundamental use-or-lose logic of 
nuclear war would be activated; the Soviet Union would have real incentive to launch 
before its reserves were lost.  
Desmond Ball also argued for greater attention to the challenges of escalation 
control at sea, whether inadvertent, accidental, or intentional.67 Ball pointed out that “the 
sea is the only area where nuclear weapon platforms of the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
actually come into physical contact” and that the problem of accidents was particularly 
salient.68 Games of chicken and harassment for tactical purposes could have led to an 
exchange of fire, leading at best to a political crisis and at worst to active conflict. Indeed, 
under the Holystone program, American intelligence-gathering missions using attack 
submarines had resulted in a string of collisions with Soviet subs. The Holystone 
missions, begun under Eisenhower, reportedly gave submarine captains the authority to 
use their weapons, including nuclear weapons, if threatened; these weapons did not 
require a second authentication in order to launch.69 While doctrinally the Navy insisted 
that commanders would receive positive launch authorization from the National 
Command Authority before any SLBMs could be launched, there were no technical or 
physical limitations beyond the coordination of personnel across the submarine itself. 
Personnel discipline was expected to constrain commanders from unauthorized launch.  
John Mearsheimer further argued that this new maritime strategy did not 
contribute as much to deterrence stability as its authors argued. He described the strategy 
as having an “amorphous and elastic quality about it,”70 underpinned by four offensive 
concepts: direct military impact, horizontal escalation, offensive sea control, and 
counterforce coercion. Mearsheimer suggested that the first two of these were red 
herrings. The Navy could not do sufficient damage to the Soviet homeland to justify its 
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resource demands, nor would such a capability deter the Soviets from invading Europe. 
Neither would an effort to broaden a war by attacking peripheral states and allies; the 
Soviet Union would be unlikely to divert resources to peripheral areas while intense 
fighting continued in Central Europe, and once it had freed up and redeployed resources, 
the Navy would be unable to hold on to whatever gains it might have made. 
Mearsheimer argued that a defensive sea control position was optimal. Sea power 
could remain a key element in containing and deterring the Soviet Union by maintaining 
a barrier in the GIUK gap, continuing to perform ASW activities in the open ocean below 
the barrier to neutralize any submarines that got through, and providing ASW capabilities 
to convoys. Offensive sea control, on the other hand, would threaten the Soviet Union’s 
strategic reserve under false assumptions about the military effectiveness of attacking 
Soviet submarines in their home waters. Mearsheimer suggested that offensive sea 
control and counterforce coercion were closely related in operational approach—the 
pursuit of Soviet submarines by American ASW assets—but that counterforce coercion 
was even more fundamentally problematic. While it created the possibility of inadvertent 
nuclear war that would follow Schelling’s concept of the manipulation of risk as a 
deterrent, proponents of such an approach misunderstood the ways in which counterforce 
coercion would undermine deterrence stability even as it destroyed crisis stability 
entirely. Should the Soviet Union believe the sinking of a submarine was a first volley in 
a war, it may be inclined to respond forcefully.   
Mearsheimer concluded that the maritime strategy’s postures could actually 
detract from deterrence in Europe. He described the idea of using SSNs to strike SSBNs 
early in a conventional war as “destabilizing in a crisis and potentially escalatory in a 
conflict.”71 The budgetary resources that the Navy was demanding for its 600-ship fleet 
would be better spent building up NATO ground and air capabilities in Central Europe, 
where they would have a greater deterrent value as well as a greater war fighting value. 
“In the final analysis,” Mearsheimer argued, “the central question is not whether the 
United States can hurt the Soviets with its navy, but whether NATO can protect its 
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SLOCs from Soviet submarines. Sea control is the key issue.”72 The aggressive pursuit of 
Soviet submarines could not guarantee the security of the SLOCs, but it could generate 
escalatory pressures. 
While the maritime strategy persisted within the Navy through the rest of the 
1980s, its efforts to rethink America’s strategic approach to the Soviet Union were not 
adopted broadly. According to Baer, “what to the Navy seemed a virtue and the best way 
to fight a war seemed to political authorities, and to the other services, unnecessary and 
dangerous in the nuclear age. Few were willing to forsake the grotesque stability of 
deterrence to approve the Navy’s offensive strategy, or to value an actual war with the 
Soviet Union as an instrument of policy.”73 This episode clearly demonstrates the 
potential for bureaucratic interests to make submarine-based deterrence dangerous by 
promoting offensive strategies that are destabilizing during crisis.  
D. EVALUATING STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE COLD WAR 
With the peaceful collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union, discussions about 
strategic stability and the effects of an aggressive maritime strategy became less urgent, 
though some strategists were not yet willing to let it go. Robert Glasser built on the Cold 
War-era work in a 1992 article titled, “Enduring Misconceptions of Strategic Stability: 
The Role of Nuclear Missile-Carrying Submarines.” He argued that beyond the problems 
of SSBNs that Mearsheimer, Posen, and Ball had identified, U.S. strategists had 
underestimated the “destabilizing properties” of SLBMs, which incentivize command and 
control decapitation strikes.74 Furthermore, he suggested, SLBMs are prone to loss of 
control in crises because they lack permissive action links (PAL) and they regularly come 
into contact with enemy forces even in peacetime. SLBMs also complicate the problem 
of attributing attacks; without accurate attribution, retaliation becomes a high-stakes 
guessing game. 
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These arguments did little to undermine the U.S. Navy’s continued support for the 
SSBN fleet. Through the 1990s and the first decades of the 2000s, America has been able 
to rest easy that its strategic deterrent was sufficient for any potential adversary. These 
conditions have led to a corresponding disinterest in the mechanisms and logic by which 
naval nuclear weapons can be said to provide deterrent value or the problems and 
challenges associated with sea-based deterrence. Within the United States, the only 
conversation to be found about ballistic missile submarines today is the ongoing debate 
about which agency should fund the Ohio SSBN replacement program and how few ships 
can be commissioned without decreasing the deterrent patrol tempo. Debate over the 
Ohio replacement is generally divorced from broader conversations about deterrence, 
however, focusing instead on budgets and bureaucratic power. The SSN fleet is subject to 
similar thinking; even as combatant commands demand greater support from submarine 
assets, within Congress and the Navy the conversation is about budgets and intra-service 
competition for resources.  
Despite a multitude of incidents involving spying submarines, simulated attacks, 
and near-misses, at no point during the Cold War did a crisis escalate to nuclear use. 
Strategic stability was maintained even as crisis stability was tested. It is impossible to 
state conclusively that SSBNs were more stabilizing than not during the Cold War, but if 
SSBNs did contribute to peace, it was because the superpowers’ second strike was 
credible and secure and thus assured. The Cold War adversaries achieved technological 
credibility in part through the development of naval nuclear reactors that allowed their 
deterrents to remain submerged and thus hard to find.  
Early nuclear submarines, however, were noisy and, as noted, relatively easy to 
track, so nuclear propulsion and its attendant benefits cannot have been the sole driver of 
credibility and security. Though often overlooked in the contemporary literature and 
public debates, the distances involved and the quantity of delivery systems were equally 
important in the pursuit of credibility and security. This has serious implications for 
India, which will be operating a small fleet in close proximity to one of its major 
adversaries. Until the development of SLBMs with intercontinental ranges, distance 
offered some security against ASW: Soviet SSBNs would have to pass U.S. acoustic 
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barriers to access the open ocean and get within firing range, which gave the U.S. a 
greater sense of security and reduced its incentives to act aggressively against the 
Soviet’s strategic reserve in a crisis. Cold War deterrence also rested in part on the 
quantity of delivery systems. By 1988, the Soviet Union fielded 77 SSBNs, while the 
U.S. had 36.75 As good as American ASW was, the United States could never be entirely 
sure it could find and eliminate all Soviet SSBNs, particularly as quieting technologies 
improved. There was a certain credibility offered by these quantities; even if a few boats 
experienced mechanical failures or accidents, both sides could rest assured there were 
many others still on patrol. Especially for the Soviets, quantity obviated some of the 
quality problems they experienced.  
1. Assessing Arms Race Stability  
If nuclear proliferation optimists are correct, the acquisition of an assured second 
strike should be welcomed, as it would imply that any adversary would be deterred from 
conducting a first strike by the threat of countervalue punishment. Assuming nuclear 
warfighting was off the table, there would then be no need for additional land- or air-
based nuclear assets, as existential security would be assured. The development of robust 
SSBN fleets did not seem to generate a sense of security on either side of the Cold War, 
however. Even as the superpowers pursued—and achieved—credible, assured, secure 
second-strike capabilities, they continued to develop new land- and air-based delivery 
systems, more advanced missiles, and better warheads. SSBNs did not prevent the United 
States or the Soviet Union from adopting expansive target sets and building several 
thousand nuclear warheads—at their peak, some estimates suggest the United States had 
over 23,000 devices, while the Soviets had 45,000.76 To be sure, decisions regarding 
intra-country horizontal and vertical proliferation are not strictly rational. Outside 
influences such as bureaucratic politics, national prestige, and path dependence often 
conspire to generate upward pressure on arsenal size and diversity. Nevertheless, the 
notion that SSBNs preclude further nuclear arsenal growth is empirically unfounded. 
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There is evidence to suggest, however, that SSBNs can generate demands for 
larger arsenals of conventional ASW assets, as in the United States during the late 1970s 
and 1980s. While in an ideal world adversaries would accept mutual vulnerability and 
decline to pursue one another’s second-strike assets, the reality is that states seem 
unwilling to forgo ASW when faced with a potentially existential threat for which there 
might be a military solution. India is likely to experience just such a situation as Pakistan 
and China build up their attack submarine fleets. As noted earlier, the U.S. demand for 
SSNs for ASW purposes spiked dramatically after the introduction of the Delta-I class. 
The need to conduct intelligence gathering against new adversary submarines also drives 
demand for SSNs. These assets offer an additional possible vector for crisis instability. 
There is also the opportunity cost associated with a conventional submarine arms race. 
Outside of their ISR functions, attack submarines are primarily useful for blockades and 
high-end warfighting; they have little utility for counter-piracy operations or 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), which have been a significant part of 
the South Asian navies’ mission sets. By purchasing more submarines, states may shift 
resources away from these traditional roles and thus have fewer assets available that 
allow for gradations of force.  
2. Crisis Stability Revisited 
As the Cold War experience demonstrated, national strategy and a navy’s 
doctrines have a substantial effect on how stabilizing or destabilizing a fleet of ballistic 
missile submarines might be. The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the problems of 
predelegation and command and control, along with the potential for aggressive ASW 
behavior to generate inadvertent escalation. Bureaucratic politics and preferences in the 
Department of Defense also played a significant role in generating instability. The U.S. 
Navy’s need to remain at parity with the Air Force with regard to budgets and to national 
strategy drove it to adopt the risky Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. Furthermore, the 
desire to be part of the fight against the Soviet Union led the Navy to pursue actions and 
doctrines that, on balance, increased the risk of nuclear war. India is likely face similar 
challenges as the United States, and will need to be on guard against suboptimal 
bureaucratic decision-making that leads to crisis instability. India will also need to 
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address the question of command and control during crises, lest the ambiguity generate 
either unwarranted fear or overconfidence on the part of adversaries. These issues will be 
addressed more thoroughly in the following two chapters. 
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IV. INDIA’S INTERNAL CHALLENGES AND DOCTRINES 
The problems and potential sources of instability identified in the previous two 
chapters are not simply artifacts of the Cold War context; rather, as will be explored in 
the next two chapters, these are problems that are likely to recur in South Asia as well. 
Bureaucratic and organizational change, advances in ASW, geostrategic realities, and 
naval and nuclear doctrine and strategy are inescapable problems to which India must 
find its own solutions.  
In order to understand the South Asian dyads and the potential impact of an 
Indian sea-based deterrent, it is necessary to begin with a brief examination of the history 
of India’s submarine fleet, with an eye toward understanding the likelihood that the 
Indian Navy will be able to address the internal challenges posed by the introduction of 
nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines into the fleet. I then expand into a 
discussion of India’s motivations for pursuing a sea-based deterrent, as well as the 
problems posed for India’s nuclear posture and strategy. The following chapter will 
explore the India-China and India-Pakistan relationships to determine the effects an 
Indian SSBN fleet could have on these dyads with respect to crisis stability and arms race 
stability. 
A. INDIA’S CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINE FLEET  
Since India’s founding in 1947, the Navy has had some interest in submarines, 
though it did not acquire its first boat for another two decades. In the first plan formulated 
after independence, the Indian Navy proposed the acquisition of four submarines. No 
timetables were attached to this request, however, and the budget plan for 1948–1958 did 
not include the creation of a submarine branch. According to the official history of the 
Indian Navy, Transition to Triumph, “the Navy found it exceedingly difficult to carry 
conviction, either in India or Britain, that the Submarine Arm was a priority requirement. 
In the context of a non-violent, peace-loving member of the British Commonwealth 
whose over-riding priority was economic development, nobody was prepared to accept 
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that India at all needed a patently offensive Submarine Arm.” Nevertheless, Indian sailors 
began receiving training from the British, including service aboard British submarines.  
India’s defeat by China in 1962 provided the Navy an opportunity to reopen 
discussion of a submarine branch, lest Chinese submarines put Indian assets in the Bay of 
Bengal at risk. While initial plans recommended that three submarines be purchased from 
Britain, British ships proved too expensive. After the United States dismissed non-
aligned India’s request, India turned to Russia. Then-Deputy Chief of Naval Staff 
Admiral Kohli wrote, “Having tried both the USA and UK and drawn a blank from both 
countries, we had no alternative but to go to the Soviet Union. This decision was taken 
after the most careful consideration as it would mean going to the Communist camp for 
the first time.”77 Despite never having trained on Russian subs, India signed an 
agreement with the Soviet Union in 1965, and two Indian crews were sent to Vladivostok 
to receive training in July 1966.  
By 1968, India had acquired its first submarine, INS Kalvari, as well as the 
beginning of a submarine base and related infrastructure at Visakhapatnam. Kalvari, a 
Soviet-built Foxtrot-class diesel-electric patrol submarine, displaced 2,475 tons when 
submerged and could carry 22 torpedoes or 44 mines. By 1970, the first four subs had 
arrived, and in 1971, a follow-on agreement was signed for four additional Russian ships 
of a similar design. India also acquired a submarine depot ship, INS Amba, to provide 
repairs while the dockyard at Visakhapatnam was being constructed.  
The 1971 War demonstrated the value of India’s submarine fleet even as it made 
clear that “there is a vast difference between merely deploying submarines and 
conducting a campaign,” as India’s 2007 maritime strategy would later explain.78 While 
India lost a frigate to a Pakistani submarine, the Indian fleet, including two of its 
submarines, was able to blockade the Karachi harbor and prevent the Pakistani fleet from 
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providing support in the Bay of Bengal. After the 1971 War, India built a second 
submarine base at Mumbai to save valuable transit time.  
The next several decades saw India struggle to indigenize as many elements of its 
submarine program as possible, including refits and repairs and the production of 
submarine batteries. In 1981, India signed a contract for four SSKs with Howaldtswerke-
Deutsche Werft (HDW), a German shipbuilding company. Two ships were to be built in 
Germany and two in Mumbai, thus beginning India’s efforts to learn to build submarines. 
A further eight Kilo-class ships were acquired from Russia in the late 1980s.  
By the early 1990s, India operated 20 conventional submarines and had begun its 
forays into the world of naval nuclear propulsion. In January 1988, India received its first 
nuclear submarine on lease from the Soviet Union, a Charlie-class SSN inducted into the 
Indian Navy as INS Chakra. Initially commissioned into the Soviet Navy in 1967, the 
aging Chakra was returned to the Soviet Union three years after delivery, in January 
1991, and was decommissioned shortly thereafter. While in the Indian Navy’s inventory, 
it was partially manned by Soviet sailors charged with training the Indians on the 
operation of a nuclear submarine. At present, India’s only SSN is the newest iteration of 
INS Chakra, commissioned into the fleet in 2012.  
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARIHANT 
In 1992, India began the construction of a shipbuilding center at Visakhapatnam 
at which it would develop the Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV) that would later 
become INS Arihant. As noted earlier, Arihant has been touted as an indigenously 
designed and manufactured SSBN, though it bears an unsurprisingly strong resemblance 
to a Russian Akula-II. Arihant was first launched in 2009 for sea trials, and in August 
2013, the reactor went critical, marking a milestone in India’s development of advanced 
undersea capabilities. Arihant is powered by an 85-megawatt nuclear reactor and is 
expected to carry one of two possible SLBM loadouts: 12 K-15 or Sagarika missiles, 
each carrying a 1000 kg warhead with a range up to 700 km, or four K-4 missiles, each 
with a 2500 kg warhead and a maximum range of 3500 km.79 Another two or three boats 
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of the same class are currently under construction; the eventual total class size is 
variously reported to be between three and six boats.80  
For all the self-congratulations that accompanied Arihant’s launch, it is unclear 
whether the Indian bureaucracy will be able to deliver and sustain the subsurface 
capabilities necessary for an operational sea-based deterrent, which will require a 
minimum of three SSBNs, along with the associated weapons, ship repair, and logistics 
infrastructure in order to keep at least one nuclear-armed boat at sea at all times.81 
Arihant is already three years behind schedule. The two primary ballistic missile types 
are under development, though neither can yet be considered operational. Sagarika has 
undergone several successful rounds of testing from an underwater pontoon; the next 
major milestone will be a launch from Arihant herself. The other missile type, K-4, has 
only been fired from a submerged pontoon once; much more testing is necessary before it 
could be inducted into the fleet.  
1. Bureaucratic Sclerosis and Acquisition Delays 
If India’s acquisition of conventional submarine technology is any indicator, it is 
likely that the introduction and operationalization of Arihant and her sister ships will face 
yet more delays. According to a 2014 statement by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, 
India “has yet to build a single submarine of the 24 it had planned starting in 1999.”82 In 
2005, after nine years of negotiations, India inked a $3.1 billion deal with France to 
provide six Scorpene-class submarines, two of which are expected to be equipped with 
AIP technology that will allow them to go without snorkeling for up to 21 days.83 The 
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“Project-75” Scorpenes are being built at Mazagon Docks in Mumbai under a technology 
transfer agreement with France. Construction on the first ship in the class began in 2006, 
with an expected delivery date of 2012; the rest were to be delivered by 2017.84 The 
timetable has since been pushed back by four years because of “problems over 
technology transfers, lengthy price negotiations and overly complex negotiations on local 
co-production.”85  
While the French-designed SSPs will not provide the mobility and endurance of a 
nuclear submarine, they will “greatly reduce the ‘indiscretion rate’ of a traditional diesel-
electric submarine, which must expose a snorkeling mast to recharge its batteries every 
few days at a minimum, and much more frequently if forced to operate at high speed.”86 
They would certainly be an improvement over the current diesel-electric fleet, of which 
eight of the 13 are over 25 years old and thus operating beyond their expected service 
life.87 A 2014 analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies stated, “Of [the 
13 SSKs], three are undergoing ‘medium refits’ (one has been in refit for nine years); and 
the Sindhuratna will be out of action for some time. This leaves only three or four 
submarines available for patrols at any given time.”88  
As argued earlier, the introduction of Arihant will create a greater demand for 
additional subsurface capabilities, if only to monitor adversaries’ attack submarines that 
may be tracking and collecting intelligence about the SSBNs. In addition to the 
Scorpenes, a tender for an additional six SSPs has been issued with an estimated price tag 
of $8.1 billion. These “Project-75-India” ships will be constructed in India with foreign 
collaboration. While the project was granted “acceptance of necessity” in 2007, the first 
boat will not be delivered until at least 2025.89 In February 2015, the Indian government 
announced that it would construct six indigenously-built SSNs. The cost is currently 
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estimated at $9.7 billion, but technical specifications have yet to be drafted.90 Sources 
told Times of India that the government has “reworked” the 1999 submarine-building 
plan and is now aiming for six SSNs and 18 diesel-electric boats.91 
Despite the articulated need for new submarines and the obsolescence of the 
current fleet, India’s acquisitions have been remarkably slow, pointing to a disconnect 
between rhetoric and reality that opens up questions about India’s commitment to fully 
developing its underwater arm. Several reasons have been offered for this inattention to 
the conventional submarine force: political indecision, bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of 
financial resources, lack of shipyard infrastructure, and project mismanagement are only 
a few.92 This bureaucratic inertia may also hamper India’s ability to fully incorporate its 
subs into its strategic plans, raising further questions about the credibility and reliability 
of a so-called “assured” second strike. Regarding the acquisition of conventional 
capabilities, Walter Ladwig argues that “the lethargic pace with which the [Ministry of 
Defence] has pursued new submarines demonstrates the relative lack of interest in the 
submarine fleet.”93 While this lack of interest may benefit crisis stability through an 
absence of additional conventional assets, it could also create problems if adversaries 
impute the problems the conventional program faces to the strategic program. If 
adversaries believe India is not able or willing to maintain a safe and secure fleet of 
SSBNs, they may be emboldened in crises to believe they could attrite what few systems 
exist at that moment. This would create clear use-or-lose pressures for India.   
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2. Accidents, Incidents, and Safety  
As the Cold War experience shows, the development of a credible deterrent must 
go beyond simply constructing missiles and delivery systems. India must also cultivate a 
bureaucratic infrastructure dedicated to honestly and rapidly correcting mistakes 
throughout the institution, as the United States did in the wake of the Thresher accident. 
This is especially crucial for a fleet as small as India’s is projected to be. Given India’s 
historic linkages to the Russian submarine force and ship design, particularly with 
regards to naval nuclear propulsion, and given Russia’s checkered history of accidents as 
a result of design flaws and low-quality materials and workmanship, India will need to be 
extra vigilant about safety as it broadens its introduction of nuclear power and weapons to 
its fleet. If India and its adversaries believe its second strike rests on the SSBN fleet, the 
loss of a single boat could jeopardize the credibility of India’s second strike. While 
unlikely, an adversary considering a first strike could avail itself of the opportunity 
presented by the incapacitation of the deployed boat to target those remaining in port in a 
first strike.  
INS Chakra, India’s only SSN, highlights the necessity of thoroughgoing 
organizational change that embraces a rigorous approach to safety and maintenance. 
Chakra is the former Russian SSN Nerpa, an Akula II-class boat, quiet and advanced. 
Russia, which never adopted a safety-first approach to submarine construction, has a long 
track record of serious mechanical problems with its submarines. The construction of 
Nerpa began in 1993, but was delayed for a decade as a result of funding difficulties in 
Russia. In 2004, India signed an agreement to subsidize construction, and after a series of 
delays, Nerpa was launched for sea trials in October 2008. A month later, Nerpa’s fire 
suppressant system was accidentally triggered, causing the deaths of 20 Russian sailors 
and injuring dozens more. Repairs to Nerpa took another year, and the boat was not 
delivered to India until October 2011. While Russia has been able to offset technical 
weakness with sheer quantity, India will need to be more attentive to the need for 
bureaucratic change and a robust safety program. 
The likelihood of accidents is of course difficult to determine, but India’s safety 
and maintenance record with its conventional submarines is less than stellar, suggesting 
 52 
the Navy bureaucracy may not be up to the task of stewarding a new class of boats. 
Delayed maintenance and service life extensions have taken their toll on the small fleet of 
aging diesel submarines currently in the Indian Navy. Even regular maintenance is no 
guarantee of safety. In August 2013, having recently returned from a $133 million refit in 
Russia, an explosion aboard INS Sindhurakshak while in port took the lives of all 18 
sailors aboard.94 This followed a 2010 incident on the same boat involving a faulty 
battery valve that caused an explosion that killed one sailor and injured two others. In 
February 2014, a fire aboard INS Sindhuratna killed two and injured seven. The 
following month, one civilian was killed and two injured when a hatch blew off during a 
hydro-pressure test on INS Aridhaman, the second ship in the Arihant class. According to 
a report by The Times of India, “the accident comes at a time when the ‘hull and full 
form’ of INS Aridhaman… is ready for ‘launch’ into water.” An unnamed officer quoted 
in that article suggested that had the accident occurred inside the submarine, it would 
have been “catastrophic.”95  
These high-profile accidents led to the resignation of Chief of Naval Staff 
Admiral D.K. Joshi, who took “moral responsibility” for the string of incidents.96 Several 
months later The Hindu reported that Joshi blamed “a ‘dysfunctional and inefficient 
business model’ in which the service has professional competence, accountability and 
responsibility but no financial empowerment.”97  He was replaced two months later by 
Admiral Rabinder (Robin) Kumar Dhowan, who will face myriad challenges in his 
efforts to improve operational readiness, including procurement delays, training and 
safety shortfalls, and troubled civil-military relations. As former Navy Chief Admiral 
Arun Prakash said, “All in all, 2014 was a year of mixed fortunes for the Navy. With the 
induction of Vikramaditya and sea trials of Arihant the service has crossed significant 
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milestones. But with two serious accidents and the resignation of a chief, the Navy needs 
to undertake introspection and draw some lessons, which I am sure is being done.”98  
The lessons the Navy must draw include the need for organizational and cultural 
changes in order to field a credible and assured second-strike capability. The effective 
employment of a submarine force involves highly specialized, highly technical 
knowledge for which the organizational learning curve is steep.99 Absent cultural and 
bureaucratic changes to increase the reliability of the delivery system, a small fleet of 
SSBNs may invite an adversary to believe that the second strike is not credible and that 
attrition is possible in the event of a crisis. This is not to suggest that India will not 
eventually be able to field its planned fleet of SSBNs, but there is reason to believe it will 
be much slower and the deterrent less secure and assured than initially hoped.   
C. INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND PURSUIT OF A TRIAD  
Despite the internal challenges associated with the introduction of the Arihant 
class, the logic behind India’s pursuit of an SSBN is broadly similar to that of the United 
States during the Cold War. Bernard Brodie’s point regarding the cost-benefit analysis 
associated with the pursuit of a submarine-based deterrent is relevant in South Asia as 
well; though the costs may be high relative to land-based assets, there is an irreplaceable 
value associated with a credible, secure, and assured second strike when facing nuclear-
armed adversaries. Writing in 2001, Ashley Tellis argued that the Indian government 
would pursue a sea-based nuclear deterrent “simply as a hedge against strategic 
uncertainty.”100 He further suggested that only if the strategic environment “[imposes] 
burdens of the sort that cannot be neutralized through land-based solutions” would the 
Indian government actually deploy nuclear weapons at sea.101 If this is so, it would 
appear that India has definitively concluded that land-based missiles are insufficient to 
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meet the threat India believes itself to face, and that it therefore requires a deployable 
nuclear triad.  
India publicly raised the idea of a nuclear triad in 1998. According to C. Raja 
Mohan, India’s 1999 draft nuclear doctrine indicated two potentially contradictory 
principles: “One was that India would limit itself to a credible minimum deterrent and 
had no wish to embark on an arms race with any other country. At the same time, the 
doctrine declared that India will develop the classical ‘triad’ of delivery systems.”102 
Rear Admiral Raja Menon, perhaps India’s foremost expert on India’s submarine force 
and its nuclear aspirations, has argued that “eventually nuclear subs earn their keep every 
day of the year. Ballistic missile submarines save nations on that one fateful day, when 
the enemy’s political leaders look at our SLBMs and stay their hand on the button.” He 
further suggests that only SSBNs offer an “unshakeable second strike” that increases the 
credibility of a No First Use doctrine.103 While India’s land-based nuclear arsenal may be 
large enough to withstand a counterforce strike and still retaliate with sufficient power to 
destroy its attacker, submarines in theory are hard to find and are always on the move, 
making them elusive targets. They would thus be secure from a decapitation attempt and 
would assure India’s ability to massively retaliate, at least in theory.  
As Arihant nears operational status, it is worth examining how India sees the third 
leg of the nuclear triad fitting into its overall nuclear strategy. A substantial literature on 
India’s nuclear strategy and doctrines has developed over the last several decades, 
primarily focused on its land-based force posture. Historically, India’s nuclear posture 
has rested on three precepts: the policy of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons; the goal 
of credible minimum deterrence; and the principle of robust civilian control of the 
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nuclear arsenal, in part through the maintenance of weapons in a disassembled state.104 
Indeed, as India’s 2007 maritime strategy document states:  
Our ‘No First Use’ policy amply illustrates India’s intentions of using the 
nuclear deterrent only as a retaliatory measure of last resort. The sea-based 
leg of the nuclear triad enables a survivable second-strike capability and 
is, therefore, a critical enabler for the nuclear doctrine of ‘No First Use’ to 
attain credibility. … The nuclear submarine option is the preferred arsenal 
for small nuclear forces.105 
The introduction of a sea-based deterrent accords well with India’s NFU policy, with two 
stipulations. First, the SSBN delivery system must be credible and safe in order to 
provide the assured second strike. Second, in order to avoid undermining the NFU 
pledge, the SLBMs on board must be imprecise enough that they are appropriate only for 
a countervalue strike and not for a counterforce strike. If they can be used for a 
counterforce attack, adversaries are likely to invest in additional ASW assets to keep 
India’s SSBNs out of striking range—generating additional upward pressure on ASW 
and strategic arsenals. 
While perhaps not at odds with its No First Use doctrine, an Indian SSBN does 
open up questions about potential changes to India’s command and control procedures 
and preferences. Indian civilian leaders have been loath to give control of assembled 
nuclear weapons to the Indian armed forces, leading to the (perhaps now erroneous) 
belief that India’s nuclear weapons are maintained in a “disassembled and dispersed 
configuration.”106 For the land-based weapons, the Defence Research and Development 
Organisation (DRDO) maintains the nuclear warheads, while the delivery systems belong 
to the armed forces. This is obviously an extremely unlikely configuration for an SLBM 
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on a deterrent patrol, and may reflect a shift in Indian attitudes toward assertive civilian 
control. Such a shift would be particularly troubling for Pakistan, which has come to 
expect that the Indian civilian government will keep the Indian military in check during 
crises. The Indian government has given no clear indication how it intends to reconcile 
the question of civilian control over nuclear assets at sea.  
Two related command and control issues are the “always-never dilemma” and the 
problem of maintaining communications with deployed submarines. The “always-never 
dilemma” refers to the challenge of ensuring that nuclear weapons are always ready for 
use but can never be launched accidentally or without the proper authorization. In the 
context of ballistic missile submarines, the problem of unauthorized launch becomes a 
technological question as much as a personnel surety issue. For submarines, constant 
communication is undesirable, as message traffic could be used to locate the boat. In the 
event of a crisis, the destruction of C2 nodes such as VLF stations could mean any 
SSBNs on patrol would be unable to receive instructions. In the event of connectivity 
failure, the question of predelegation arises: if the political leadership cannot be reached, 
how should the forces respond? Who, if anybody, has launch authority?107  
As Feroz Khan argues, “The propensity of South Asia to run into crisis makes the 
case for establishing a reliable command and control system all the more crucial.” He 
continues by noting that “the vulnerability of the central command to a decapitating 
attack forces it to pre-delegate not the authority to launch nuclear weapons, but the ability 
to do so. While bolstering the deterrent threat, the diffusion of the ability to initiate 
nuclear use multiplies the difficulty of preventing three dangers: accidents, tampering, 
and un-authorized use.”108 Different countries have attempted to resolve the problem of 
ensuring political control over their SSBNs without limiting the weapon system’s 
usability in different ways. The U.S. originally opted for a two-man rule, then moved to 
PALs, while British political leaders gave their submarine commanders “beyond the 
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grave” pre-planned directives in the event that the United Kingdom was destroyed.109 It 
is not yet clear how India will resolve this particular challenge. While there are obvious 
operational security issues associated with disclosing information about an SSBN 
program, a public discussion of how Indian political leadership intends to resolve the 
always-never dilemma and the problem of maintaining assertive control might lend 
credence to India’s claim that its SSBN is a viable, considered approach to bolstering its 
minimum credible deterrent posture. Pakistan in particular has relied on India’s civilian 
leadership to keep the Indian military in check during previous crises. If Pakistan comes 
to believe that Indian SSBNs are not under robust civilian control, it may be more 
inclined toward worst-case thinking and react accordingly. As Raja Menon notes, “In 
deterrence, only perceptions matter and there is a disturbing build-up of literature 
indicating that the disbelief of others in our nuclear command and control is in urgent 
need of correction.”110 
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V. ARIHANT: DETERRING WAR OR COURTING DISASTER? 
The internal challenges India is facing in building, acquiring, and fielding new 
submarines, including the Arihant-class ships, have repercussions for its relations with its 
regional rivals. In this chapter, I will unpack the potential effects the Indian SSBN may 
have on China and on Pakistan, with an emphasis on arms race stability and crisis 
stability. While it is unlikely that Arihant will induce major changes in China’s naval or 
nuclear policies, it is also unlikely to achieve any of India’s strategic aims vis-à-vis 
China. With regards to Pakistan, however, Arihant and her sisters may generate a new 
vector for crisis instability. Furthermore, India’s SSBN acquisition increases the pressure 
Pakistan feels to acquire its own triad while driving Pakistan’s need for additional 
conventional naval capabilities. 
A. INDIA-CHINA DYAD 
India’s initial decision to acquire nuclear weapons was driven in large part by its 
relations with China.111 After the disastrous 1962 Sino-Indian war over an unresolved 
border, India had a black eye and a deep-seated fear of China that drove its turn toward 
realpolitik—and toward nuclear weapons. The Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor in 1964 
provided further impetus for India’s nuclear weapons program. Since then, concern about 
Chinese intentions and capabilities have undergirded Indian strategic thinking. The Sino-
Indian border issues in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin have not yet been resolved, 
which leaves India uneasy and gives China the upper hand in bilateral negotiations, as it 
knows India would strongly prefer a compromise to a confrontation.112 As China 
continues to grow economically and militarily, India finds itself in the uncomfortable 
position of trying to ward off Chinese aggression while not provoking China into an arms 
race. This balancing act is complicated by India’s close trade relationship with China: 
China is India’s top trading partner. These trade ties could be a potential source of 
stability and cooperation in the future; economic integration often creates incentives for 
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greater cooperation through raising the opportunity cost of conflict. However, while there 
is a historical correlation between increased regional trade and improved regional 
security, there are numerous cases in which tightly integrated economies have gone to 
war with one another, such as Europe during World War I.113 Trade balances are not a 
guarantee of future interdependence or the cross-border cooperation that might lead to 
increased stability.  
There is also no guarantee that this process will not reverse itself; while China and 
India have good reasons to maintain their trade relationships now, they may find 
themselves in competition for the resources necessary for economic growth, particularly 
energy. Both countries require economic growth to improve their populations’ low 
standards of living, which will be necessary, particularly for India, to prevent intrastate 
conflict from spreading. In addition to the demand for energy to run the businesses and 
factories that drive economic development, there is growing consumer demand for 
electricity and oil. According to Ladwig, India’s current oil consumption is expected to 
double by 2025, most of which must be imported. This demand bubble is growing even 
as global oil resources become scarcer and more expensive. This competition over 
resources could lead to a more adversarial relationship and more aggressive postures as 
India expands its “legitimate areas of interest” to include the arc from the Straits of 
Malacca to the Persian Gulf.114  
It is in the context of resource access and regional influence that China has been a 
significant factor in India’s naval acquisition and modernization efforts. As China’s 
maritime ambitions have grown and its navy has expanded, India has become 
increasingly concerned about what it perceives as a serious and growing threat to India’s 
interests throughout the IOR. A partially declassified Indian government report from 
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2001 noted “India’s ‘vital interest in the security and stability of the Sea Lanes of 
Communication in the Indian Ocean’ because of energy and trade flows” and in 2004, 
“the navy formally enunciated its area of interest as stretching from the Persian Gulf to 
the Malacca Strait. With over half of India’s trade passing through the strait, and China’s 
People’s Liberation Army Navy achieving greater reach into the Indian Ocean, the 
strategic focus of the Indian navy was extended to a ‘secondary’ maritime area including 
the South China Sea.”115 In 2009, former Chief of the Indian Navy Admiral Arun 
Prakash declared, “It is time for India to shed her blinkers and prepare to counter PLA 
Navy’s impending power-play in the Indian Ocean.”116  
China’s increasing engagement with IOR states has India drawing redlines “vis-à-
vis Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean,” according to James Holmes and Toshi 
Yoshihara, “with the goal of deterring Beijing from actions that infringe unacceptably on 
Indian interests as India interprets them.”117 Among these redlines, Holmes and 
Yoshihara identify three potential naval triggers of Sino-Indian hostilities: forward 
deployment of Chinese nuclear submarines to the Indian Ocean; the development of a 
network of Chinese naval facilities across the IOR; or a Chinese effort to keep India out 
of the South China Sea. While it seems unlikely that any of these developments would 
lead directly to war absent other drivers, there is a great deal of consternation among 
Indian navalists about the threats posed by Chinese submarines. In 2013, for example, an 
Indian defense ministry report indicated that China had been sending attack submarines 
into the Indian Ocean with an “‘implicit focus’ [on] undermining the Indian Navy’s 
[ability] ‘to control highly-sensitive sea lines of communication.’”118 The concern about 
China’s intentions percolates into Indian thought about Pakistan as well; in an article 
contextualizing India’s growing maritime power, Arun Prakash notes that “we need to 
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remember that Pakistan… is also a critical tool in China’s Machiavellian strategy to 
checkmate India’s inchoate ambitions of regional leadership.”119 
Indian officials and scholars have indicated that India’s pursuit of a sea-based 
deterrent is intended to deter China, but they have been less clear about precisely which 
Chinese actions or ambitions India’s SSBN could potentially deter. There is a 
disconcerting lack of conceptual clarity among Indian statements about the linkages—or 
lack thereof—between increased Chinese naval activity in the IOR and the functions an 
Indian SSBN could perform. There is no causal mechanism by which an operational 
SSBN fleet could prevent China’s naval expansion into the IOR along the lines Holmes 
and Yoshihara provide; it is simply not credible to expect India conduct a first strike, 
thereby abandoning its NFU doctrine and inviting Chinese retaliation, simply because 
China forward deployed a few submarines in the IOR. Nor can Arihant deter Chinese 
conventional adventurism on land; the fate of Arunachal Pradesh does not rest on 
Arihant’s shoulders, though a secure second strike could provide India space for more 
assertive negotiation. 
What of deterring nuclear annihilation? While India may worry in the abstract 
about a Chinese first strike, there are few plausible scenarios in which China is likely to 
see itself as deriving benefits from a massive counterforce first strike against India. Even 
granting such a possibility, an Indian SSBN provides only a marginal additional deterrent 
value against China, particularly as it is currently configured. Unless and until the K-4 is 
ready, any Indian attempt to use its new ballistic missile submarine capability in a 
second-strike role against China would require a transit to the South China Sea, or even 
the East China and Yellow Seas, to hold Chinese countervalue targets at risk. This would 
put the Indian SSBN within range of Chinese surface and air ASW capabilities, against 
which Arihant would have no defenses—hardly an assured second strike. Even with the 
K-4, the one or two SSBNs not in port during a Chinese first strike would be left to 
retaliate with a maximum of four to eight ballistic missiles. Whether China would risk 
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Indian retaliation may depend on the future configuration of the K-4 missiles, how 
reliable China considers them to be, and how confident China is in its ASW abilities 
beyond the South China Sea.  
On the positive side, an Indian SSBN fleet is unlikely to change China’s nuclear 
force posture. As noted, estimates vary, but the total figure for the Arihant-class fleet is 
thought to be in the range of 5–6 boats, which is hardly enough to induce a rethink of 
Chinese strategy and force posture. As Andrew Winner notes, “China has lived with the 
vastly more substantial submarine presence embodied by the U.S. Navy for many years. 
It will understandably regard the seagoing Indian deterrent as a lesser included case for 
peacetime strategy.”120 While China may not view India’s SSBN as an immediate threat 
that requires significant force structure changes, China is likely to increase its 
surveillance efforts in the IOR so as to collect data about Indian SSBN operational 
patterns and acoustic signatures, with submarines being an obvious choice of ISR 
platform—exactly the sort of behavior India hopes to quash.  
Indeed, it is in the conventional realm that the possibility for arms race and crisis 
instability rears its head, particularly if China develops its ASW abilities and increases 
patrols in the areas in which India’s SSBNs are likely to operate. As China improves its 
ASW capabilities and its ability to monitor the IOR from the various naval bases and 
ports it has helped build, India’s patrolling SSBN will become less secure. This is likely 
to take several years, but if China’s ASW abilities outpace India’s shipbuilding and 
quieting abilities, the trend line points toward a less secure system. While the U.S. was 
able to detect Russian subs, as explained earlier, Russia’s large quantity of boats provided 
a measure of security; the U.S. could never be entirely sure it could find all of them. 
China, however, will only have to find one or two submarines, which will have 
distinctive acoustic signatures that identify them as the Indian SSBNs. Indian attack 
submarines are likely to be tasked with counter-ASW against these Chinese ISR efforts. 
Without a framework for negotiating accidents and incidents at sea, any encounters 
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between the two forces are left to chance. As the number of conventional systems grows, 
the likelihood of accidental encounters grows apace.    
B. INDIA-PAKISTAN DYAD 
The most serious source of instability between India and Pakistan is nonstate 
actors, specifically those who have received support from Pakistan. Pakistan’s reliance on 
non-state actors is not a new phenomenon, nor is it an astrategic choice; as Kapur and 
Ganguly argue, “[Supporting] jihad has been one of the principal means by which the 
Pakistani state has sought to produce security for itself. Far from an unmitigated disaster, 
the strategy has enjoyed important domestic and international successes.”121 Stretching 
back to the first Kashmir war in 1947, Pakistan’s use of nonstate actors has stemmed 
from its material weakness vis-à-vis India; as a conventionally weak state with a 
comparatively strong state next door, Pakistan had to develop a strategy that would allow 
it to attrite Indian resources without spending a lot of money and while maintaining 
plausible deniability to prevent full-scale retaliation.  
Over the following decades, Pakistan’s use of militants became a centerpiece of 
its strategic thought, particularly after the 1971 Bangladesh War made India’s 
overwhelming conventional superiority apparent, especially as Pakistan had eschewed the 
use of militants during that conflict. While it took Pakistan some time to settle on which 
militant groups it would back, it eventually chose to partner with organizations, such as 
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, that “promoted Islamist sociopolitical agendas 
and sought Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan,”122 and were willing to use extreme 
violence to achieve their goals. Pakistan provided “extensive financial, logistical, and 
military support”123 to these groups in an effort to weaken India and keep Kashmir on the 
international agenda. Over the last decade, these groups have carried out significant 
terrorist attacks, both in Kashmir and in the Indian homeland, and while Pakistan has 
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promised to crack down on them, LeT and others continue to operate relatively freely 
within Pakistan.  
Pakistan now faces a classic principal-agent problem with the groups that it has 
funded and supported; while their interests may have aligned for a time, the militant 
groups have grown too powerful to be fully controlled by the principal, and are now in a 
position to pursue their own policies and agendas, which diverge from Pakistan’s. As 
Kapur and Ganguly note, these “nonstate actors … have taken on a life of their own. 
They now behave in ways that are not only damaging to India but also detrimental to 
Pakistan’s national interests.”124 Pakistan has belatedly discovered that these militant 
groups are pursuing more ambitious goals that do not align with Pakistani strategic 
interests. When Pakistan has attempted to retract support for these groups, however, its 
leaders have become targets for assassinations and its security installations have been 
attacked. More generally, the resources that have gone to support and then combat 
insurgent groups has created opportunity costs for a state that has long struggled with 
material weakness and low development rates. There are also indirect costs to this 
strategy; as Kapur and Ganguly argue, “Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare campaign, by 
continually provoking India, helps to create an extremely hostile and demanding strategic 
environment on the subcontinent. It is this environment, in turn, that forces Pakistan to 
devote such a high level of resources to ensuring its external security.”125  
As intended, Pakistan’s use of nonstate actors has hurt India and left it struggling 
to find appropriate ways to respond. Following the December 2001 terrorist attack on the 
Indian parliament, the Indian army laboriously mobilized to the border with Pakistan only 
to end up turning around and going home when it became clear that India had lost the 
advantage of surprise and was instead succeeding in resolving the crisis through 
diplomatic and political channels. Recognizing the need for a military option that would 
not cross Pakistan’s nuclear threshold but would allow India to punish Pakistan for 
destabilizing behavior, including the continued support of terrorist groups, India began to 
develop the Cold Start doctrine. In theory, Cold Start would allow India to make a rapid 
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but shallow assault into Pakistan and hold territory there without trigging a nuclear 
response from Pakistan. To counter Cold Start, Pakistan has pursued tactical nuclear 
weapons, with the intent of making any border crossing a step up the escalation ladder 
toward nuclear use.126 
The future of the South Asian militant groups is an open question, as neither India 
nor Pakistan has the capacity to eliminate the threat they pose. The 2008 Mumbai attacks 
demonstrated that despite the rhetoric, Pakistan has been unable to rein in these groups. 
On India’s part, a major Indian city was held hostage for three days by a handful of 
gunmen, suggesting that India’s security services are not up to the task of quelling the 
threat. Militant groups are the most likely proximate cause of instability in the region; 
while India may not care to retake by force the part of Kashmir it lost in 1947, another 
incident like the 2001 assault on parliament or an uptick in major terrorist attacks in the 
Indian homeland could cause the Indian government to respond aggressively. Within the 
India-Pakistan dyad, an assured second strike is not going to prevent conflict from 
breaking out or escalating conventionally. There is no obvious role for SSBNs to enhance 
deterrence at the subconventional or non-state actor level.  
As discussed, within traditional formulations of nuclear deterrence theory, dyadic 
pairs achieve strategic stability when both sides have an assured second-strike capability. 
This second-strike capability mitigates the arms race dynamic in which states demand 
superior numbers of nuclear weapons so as to minimize the chance of losing them all in a 
first strike. In the Indo-Pakistan context, however, nuclear arms racing has less to do with 
fears of a nuclear first strike and more to do with Indian and Pakistani fears of, 
respectively, subconventional and conventional attacks that could escalate to a nuclear 
exchange. Neither side can feel entirely confident that it can respond to provocative 
behavior without potentially stumbling into a nuclear red zone. Within this dynamic, an 
Indian SSBN cannot contribute to deterrence against Pakistan in any meaningful way. 
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India’s nuclear arsenal already has massive retaliation and second strike covered without 
Arihant, and it hasn’t solved the problem of Pakistani support for militants.  
An Indian SSBN may in fact be a new source of instability in South Asia. Arihant 
has generated arms race pressures vis-à-vis Pakistan, however much Indian strategists 
would like to deny it. Admiral Menon has argued that Pakistan’s concerns about the 
SSBN “reflect their own India-specific preoccupations and threat analysis.” He has 
blamed the “incipient arms race” on Pakistan and the “illegal” assistance it receives from 
China.127 For Pakistan, however, an Indian SSBN may provide additional upward 
pressure on Pakistan’s arsenal. As Andrew Winner explains, “The two ideal stabilizing 
characteristics of any weapon system are its invulnerability to enemy attack and its being 
nonthreatening to an enemy’s nuclear forces—presumably including the command-and-
control structures governing those forces.”128 Pakistan must now account for this 
additional threat in determining its preferred nuclear force structure.  
It should hardly come as a surprise to India that its sea-based deterrent would spur 
Pakistan to pursue its own triad. Pakistan’s perceived need to keep up with India 
militarily has long been a fundamental element in Pakistani decision-making. The most 
commonly discussed formulation of a Pakistani sea-based deterrent is a diesel-electric 
Agosta 90B equipped with air-independent propulsion and nuclear-tipped Babur cruise 
missiles. Should Pakistan acquire a triad in pursuit of parity with India, it is possible 
Pakistan could feel more secure about the survivability of its deterrent and thus less likely 
to arms race. Given Pakistan’s conventional weakness and its adoption of an asymmetric 
escalation strategy that relies on the threat of first use, however, it is more likely that 
Pakistan would simply add sea-based weapons to its arsenal while continuing its pursuit 
of new delivery systems and more warheads in its elusive pursuit of what it terms full-
spectrum deterrence.129 Sea-based weapons do not resolve the credibility problem 
surrounding Pakistan’s threat of early first use of nuclear weapons against Indian cross-
                                                 
127 Raja Menon, “We’re Not Racing Anywhere, Pakistan,” The Indian Express, August 19, 2009, 
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/were-not-racing-anywhere-pakistan/. 
128 Winner, “The Future of India’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent,” 169. 
129 See Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, particularly chapters 1–3, for an in-depth 
discussion of Pakistan’s nuclear force posture.  
 68 
border operations. Furthermore, the deployment of Pakistani nuclear warheads aboard an 
Agosta submarine introduces the specter of inadvertent escalation. In a crisis, Indian 
ASW would not be able to tell conventionally-armed Agosta 90Bs from those carrying 
nuclear warheads, and could unintentionally strike a nuclear-armed boat. Given the 
history of mistrust, Pakistan may believe such an incident to be an intentional effort to 
degrade Pakistan’s second-strike capabilities. On the conventional arms race front, 
Pakistan has also indicated its interest in better ASW, both via new attack submarines and 
additional air assets. Since 2011, Pakistan has been in negotiations with China over the 
purchase of six AIP-equipped Yuan-class submarines.130 
Pakistan is also pursuing naval nuclearization in an effort to keep pace with India, 
though it is several years away from solving the technical challenges inherent in 
miniaturizing a nuclear reactor and putting it on a boat. Here too is evidence of the desire 
for a capability outstripping the conceptual or operational requirement for that capability. 
For Pakistan, the northwest corner of the Indian Ocean presents the geographic limits of 
its maritime interests. Given the relatively smaller area in which their submarines operate, 
there is less of a technical requirement for nuclear propulsion. Moreover, the introduction 
of naval nuclear propulsion in Pakistan creates new dangers for theft of fissile material by 
militant groups and new demands for personnel reliability programs. While India ought 
not bear the blame for Pakistan’s nuclear surety problems, Pakistan’s pursuit of naval 
nuclear propulsion in an effort to keep pace with India could have deleterious effects on 
Indian security in the long run.  
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VI. CONCLUSION: DETERRING WAR WHILE COURTING 
DISASTER 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, nuclear-armed submarines are not ceteris 
paribus stabilizing elements. A close examination of the empirics of the Cold War reveal 
important dynamics that have been overlooked in the standard formulations of nuclear 
strategy. While the Brodies once argued that, “what was once regarded as a backstop to 
the land-based force of ICBMS seems likely, as the latter appear less secure, to become 
the main deterrent force,”131 there is little evidence to suggest that the acquisition of sea-
based deterrents precludes states’ ongoing pursuit of land-based or air-delivered nuclear 
weapons. Furthermore, as illustrated by the Thresher accident, nuclear-powered 
submarines introduce internal challenges for navies attempting to transition away from 
diesel even as they make safety and maintenance more critical than ever. As the nuclear 
asset most likely come into contact with neutral or hostile forces during standard 
peacetime activities, SSBNs create the potential for crisis escalation as the result of 
accidents or incidents at sea. SSBNs also raise the specter of a no-warning first strike as 
well as present a target for naval doctrines that see SSNs engaged in a counterforce 
strategy. There were real costs and trade-offs to the adoption of ballistic missile 
submarines during the Cold War, both in the form of escalation potential and in material 
and resources expended on the SSBN fleets as well as the research and development, 
acquisition, manning, and maintenance of robust air and naval ASW capabilities. 
The Cold War experience suggests that strategic stability with a nuclear triad is 
possible but conditional upon addressing four main potential problem areas: the need for 
bureaucratic and cultural change, the advances in ASW that accompany and drive 
advances in submarine technology, the geographic and geostrategic realities of expected 
operational areas, and the reconciliation of naval and nuclear strategies and doctrines. 
These conditions are both internal and external to the state introducing the system. First, 
the state must ensure that their delivery system is safe and reliable if their deterrent is to 
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be credible; an undeliverable SLBM hardly offers an assured second strike. The 
bureaucracy must make the necessary changes to operational and tactical practices and 
procedures to ensure the safe operation of the system. For the United States, reliability 
was born of thoroughgoing changes within the submarine force, while for the Soviet 
Union, reliability was a by-product of a large fleet of SSBNs. Second, the state must 
address the problem posed by an adversary’s ASW. Advances in ASW and advances in 
submarine technology are closely linked, and tend to drive arms racing behavior in this 
realm. Additionally, if an adversary does not accept mutual vulnerability and believes it 
can destroy the submarine-based second strike, a first-strike incentive remains. In the US-
Soviet dyad, quantity had its own quality; in South Asia, the small fleet of Arihant-class 
SSBNs will be kept secure by the lack of robust Chinese or Pakistani ASW capabilities. 
Third, geography matters; distance and natural barriers combined with submarine 
detection abilities minimize concerns about bolt-from-the-blue attacks, while congested 
waters provide more acoustic cover as well as increase the risk of accidental collisions. 
Fourth, a state’s nuclear strategy must clearly reserve its nuclear-armed submarines for 
retaliation against a nuclear strike, lest Schelling’s argument about the possibility of a 
submarine-launched first strike become reality. Furthermore, naval doctrine must make 
clear that there is no intent to degrade the adversary’s strategic forces.  
The empirical foundations of the assumption that submarine-based deterrents 
stabilize adversarial nuclear dyads seem shaky at best. Furthermore, the logic and 
evidence of the Cold War may not extend to other cases, such as South Asia. The 
operational environment and force size and structure under consideration suggest that 
India’s new SSBN will offer at most a marginal addition to its deterrent position, while 
generating pressure for further arms racing activity with Pakistan and a potential site for 
crisis instability with China. In the Sino-Indian dyad, India’s fleet size and force structure 
are insufficient to generate the stability it hopes for, while in the Indo-Pakistan dyad, the 
nature of the conflict and the intense mutual distrust obviate any improvements in 
strategic stability that might otherwise be gained from the development of a secure 
second strike. Furthermore, India will require sustained financial and bureaucratic efforts 
to develop a capable subsurface force and more robust ASW capabilities, which may 
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prove a greater challenge than the Indian defense ministry is able to manage. Without 
these additional capacity-building efforts, Arihant will be little more than the technology 
demonstrator it was initially intended to be. 
Troublingly, the mechanisms that made the nuclear triad stabilizing for the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union seem less available or palatable to the South Asian dyads, 
suggesting that sea-based deterrence may do more harm than good. While the U.S. and 
Soviet Union had an ongoing dialogue about restraining their nuclear forces, confidence-
building measures and notification mechanisms are fairly thin on the ground in South 
Asia. As Raja Menon notes, “the Indian National Command Authority is ill designed to 
manage the inevitable South Asian transition from conventional war to a possible nuclear 
exchange — or the frantic strategic signalling [sic] that is bound to occur as the threshold 
approaches.”132  The operational aspects of the Cold War also do not pertain in South 
Asia. Setting aside the question of NATO’s Article 5 obligations, for the United States, 
the vast distances between the homeland and the Soviet Union provided some measure of 
security against the threat of a surprise first strike. With regards to Soviet SLBMs, 
distance gave U.S. sonar sufficient time and opportunity to detect Soviet subs 
approaching the GIUK gap. Until the Delta-class subs were introduced, the Soviet Union 
did not have an SLBM capable of reaching the U.S. without first transiting into the 
Atlantic. While the distance aspect holds true for the Sino-India dyad, for India and 
Pakistan, the question of distance is clearly moot.  
Technological advances mean little if the state cannot figure out how to use it for 
strategic advantage, and there is little to indicate that a sea-based delivery system offers 
India a strategic advantage that is worth the risks and tradeoffs incurred. While it is taken 
as an article of faith in India that the acquisition of a sea-based deterrent is a logical step, 
there has been little public discussion about the underlying rationale for such a decision, 
nor has there been much analysis of the risks involved. It seems unlikely that China 
would be deterred by an Indian SSBN if it hasn’t been deterred by any other Indian 
nuclear capability; while China may find Arihant a sufficiently credible threat that it 
                                                 
132 Menon, “A Mismatch of Nuclear Doctrines.” 
 72 
would refrain from a first strike, it’s also plausible that if China were intent on executing 
such a strike, particularly before the K-4 missile is operational, it could adopt the tactics 
associated with the U.S.’s strategy for the GIUK gap. Under such an approach, China 
would plan to conduct intensive ASW patrols near the SLOCs surrounding the South 
China Sea to intercept India’s SSBN before it could get within striking range of major 
Chinese population centers—assuming an Indian SSBN was even out on patrol at the 
time of the attack. For Pakistan, however, Arihant presents a clear threat that must be met 
with improved ASW capabilities, as well as another instance where Pakistan will be 
willing to eat grass to have what India has—in this case, a sea-based deterrent. As Vipin 
Narang argues, “the widely held belief that India’s nuclear posture is one of ‘credible 
minimum deterrence’ is increasingly a myth. Presently, it is neither credible toward 
China, nor minimal toward Pakistan. As it continues to strive for the former… it is 
undermining the latter—in ways that could have significant consequences for a regional 
arms race.”133 In building Arihant, India’s technological abilities may have outpaced its 
strategic or doctrinal development, potentially generating the instability India had hoped 
to escape.   
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